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Introduction
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, CHAPLAINS HAVE MINISTERED to
the religious needs of military members. They provide “spiritual care
and the opportunity for [military] members, their families, and other
authorized personnel to exercise their Constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion.”1 The motto of U.S. Army chaplains captures this
fundamental spiritual core: Pro Deo et Patria2—“For God and Coun-
try.”3 But nontheists4 are now demanding their own chaplains as a
religious accommodation. Although some quip that an atheist chap-
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1. U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, POLICY DIRECTIVE 52-1, CHAPLAIN SERVICE para. 1
(2006) [hereinafter AFPD 52-1].
2. U.S. Army Chaplaincy Mission, CHAPNET, http://chapnet.chaplaincorps.net/index
.php/about-2/ (last visited May 27, 2014).
3. Randy Murrey, Army Chaplains Corps: Serving ‘God and Country’ for 234 Years with
25,000 Chaplains, U.S. ARMY (July 9, 2009), http://www.army.mil/article/24086/army-
chaplains-corps-serving-god-and-country-for-234-years-with-25000-chaplains/.
4. This Article uses the terms atheists, nontheists, and secularists to refer to those “who
take negative or skeptical positions on the existence of superhuman beings and supernatu-
ral powers.” Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2011). No disparage-
ment is meant by these terms, which are also used by the group’s own members. Although
some argue followers of Eastern religions, such as Buddhism, are also nontheists, this Arti-
cle, similar to Professor Tebbe, limits the scope of the term to traditional nonbelievers. See
id. at 1118 (defining nonbelievers as atheists, agnostics, and “most secular human-
ists, freethinkers, and the like—to the degree that they take negative or skeptical positions
on [spiritual] issues”).
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lain is an “oxymoron,”5 the issue is no laughing matter. The quest for
nontheist chaplains slices to the core of how religion is defined under
the First Amendment. This Article critically examines whether the
Free Exercise Clause6 should be used to accommodate the demand
for atheist military chaplains and proposes an alternative to admitting
atheist chaplains into the historically faith-based chaplaincy.
The push for atheist military chaplains is of recent vintage,7
emerging in 2011 as the latest salvo in the battle of the New Atheists8
against a military structure they view as beholden to Christianity.9
5. 159 CONG. REC. H4936, H4942-43 (daily ed. July 23, 2013) [hereinafter House De-
bate] (comments of Rep. Jim Bridenstine (R., OK) and Rep. John Fleming (R., LA)); Ken
Klukowski, Atheists Want Their Own Military Chaplains, BREITBART (June 5, 2013), http://
www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/06/05/Atheists-Want-Their-Own-Military-
Chaplains (“No one has yet offered an explanation of how an atheist chaplain is anything
other than an oxymoron . . . .”).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. A topic this vast could engender other lengthy articles fo-
cusing on related inquiries under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) or the Es-
tablishment Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I. But I believe the discussion should begin with
the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, I will limit the scope of this Article to that examination.
7. See Brad Hirschfield, Why the Military Needs Atheist Chaplains, FAITH STREET (Nov.
21, 2011), http://www.faithstreet.com/onfaith/2011/11/21/why-the-military-needs-athe-
ist-chaplains/10176. The mainstream news media first began to report in earnest on the
call for atheist military chaplains near the end of 2011. Id. The issue garnered further
attention a month later when National Public Radio ran a major story on one advocacy
group’s efforts to convince the military to authorize atheist chaplains. See All Things Consid-
ered: Chaplains Wanted for Atheists in Foxholes, NPR (Dec. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Chaplains
Wanted for Atheists in Foxholes], available at http://www.npr.org/2011/12/04/143057431/
chaplains-wanted-for-atheists-in-foxholes.
8. Simon Hooper, The Rise of the ‘New Atheists,’ CNN (Nov. 9, 2006), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/08/atheism.feature/. Popular authors, such as
Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, were pioneers of the modern movement
dubbed “New Atheism.” Id. They shared “a belief that religion should not simply be toler-
ated but should be countered, criticized and exposed by rational argument wherever its
influence arises. . . . Their tone is overtly confrontational rather than gently persuasive.” Id.
A subset of this movement, which includes organizations such as the Military Association of
Atheists and Freethinkers (“MAAF”) and the Military Religious Freedom Foundation
(“MRFF”), has targeted religion in the military. See MILITARY ASS’N OF ATHEISTS &
FREETHINKERS, http://militaryatheists.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2014); MILITARY RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM FOUND., http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
9. See Letter from Lori Lipman Brown, Director, Secular Coalition for America, to
President-elect Barack Obama (Nov. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Secular Letter], available at
http://otrans.3cdn.net/63cc8cf36c5b58e0be_n0m6bcl2r.pdf. In the last decade,
nontheists have raised numerous complaints about military life, especially targeting Evan-
gelical Christians. Id. The Secular Coalition for America sent a letter to President-elect
Barack Obama, asking the military to accommodate nontheistic members and “to prevent
a minority of some evangelical Christians from perpetuating employment discrimination
based on religion, coercive proselytizing in everyday activity, and an overall culture of relig-
ious intolerance against those who do not share the beliefs of this minority.” Id.
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Their quest represents an important shift in tactics in the evolving
nontheist struggle against religion in secular institutions.10 It is “part
of a broader campaign by atheists to win official acceptance in the
military,” to “raise money and meet on military bases,” and to “dis-
tribute their literature [and] advertise their events.”11 This war is not
limited to the military; it is being waged on all fronts. For instance, in
July 2012, Stanford University followed Harvard’s lead in allowing an
atheist chaplain to serve its campus community.12
Under current regulations, nontheists do not meet the minimum
qualifications for the chaplain corps because they are not endorsed by
a “qualified Religious Organization.”13 The movement to end an ex-
clusively faith-based military chaplaincy came to a head in the summer
of 2013 during Congress’s consideration of the 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act (“NDAA”).14 A proposed amendment would have
10. See Chris Carroll, Military Atheists Seeking the Rights and Benefits Offered to Religious
Groups, STARS & STRIPES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/military-atheists-seeking-
the-rights-and-benefits-offered-to-religious-groups-1.153105. From 2010 to 2011, over
twenty new nontheist groups were formed at military bases. Id.
11. James Dao, Atheists Seek Chaplain Role in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/us/27atheists.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0; see also Carroll, supra note 10 (discussing the goals of the secular group Atheists of
Meade (“ATOM”)).
12. See Nanette Asimov, Stanford Gets a Chaplain for Atheists, S.F. GATE (Dec. 22, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Stanford-gets-a-chaplain-for-atheists-4139991.php#ix
zz2L00mDW3B (noting that, even though the independent Humanist Community at Stan-
ford hires the so-called chaplain, the position is entitled to office space in the university’s
Office of Religious Life).
13. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 1304.28, GUIDANCE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS para. 6.1 (2004) (“To be considered for ap-
pointment to serve as a chaplain, an RMP [(Religious Ministry Professional)] shall receive
an endorsement from a qualified Religious Organization . . . .”); Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff
v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1137, 1166 n.201 (2007) (“The Armed Forces Chaplain Board decides
whether to accept the religious organization seeking DoD recognition to provide chaplains
for the military, and the individual or individuals endorsed by the religious organization
must meet the requirements for a commission.”); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171,
1173 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“In order to become a Navy chaplain, an individual must have an
ecclesiastical endorsement from a faith group endorsing agency certifying that the individ-
ual is professionally qualified to represent that faith group within the Chaplain Corps.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 165-1, ARMY
CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES para. 3-1(a) (2009) [hereinafter AR 165-1] (“The Chaplain is a
religious professional whose educational qualifications and certification by a religious or-
ganization meet the appointment requirements of DODD [(Department of Defense Direc-
tive)] 1304.19.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY para. 5(e)(1) (2008) [hereinafter NAVY INSTRUCTION
1730.7D].
14. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127
Stat. 672 (2013).
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required the Secretary of Defense to appoint chaplains “who are certi-
fied or ordained by non-theistic organizations and institutions, such as
humanist, ethical culturalist, or atheist.”15 The amendment failed,16
but it prompted a proposed House counter-amendment in the 2014
Department of Defense Appropriations Act17 that would have pre-
vented the Department of Defense (“DOD”) from appointing atheist
chaplains in the future.18
Can atheists constitutionally be excluded from the military chap-
laincy? This Article addresses this question within the context of the
Free Exercise Clause. Part I discusses the constitutionality of the chap-
lain corps and frames the arguments on both sides of the atheist chap-
lain issue. Part II tackles the issue’s thorniest and most abstract
question: Should atheism be considered a religion entitled to affirma-
tive protection under the Free Exercise Clause?19 Assuming atheism
should be treated as a religion, Part III examines more concrete fea-
tures of the debate, including commonly raised arguments by secular-
ists against an exclusively faith-based chaplaincy. Finally, Part IV
explores whether the admission of atheists would fundamentally rede-
fine the nature of the chaplaincy by secularizing its faith-based core.
The Article ultimately rejects the demand for atheist chaplains and, as
an alternative, suggests creating a specialized position outside the his-
torically faith-based chaplaincy.
I. Drawing First Amendment Battle Lines
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
15. Amendment to H.R. 1960 Offered by Mr. Andrews of New Jersey, SECULAR COAL. FOR AM.
(June 5, 2013), http://secular.org/files/andrew_amendment_1.pdf.
16. Rick Maze, Mixed Votes from HASC on Military Religious Freedom, NAVY TIMES (June 5,
2013), http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130605/NEWS05/306050040/Mixed-votes-
from-HASC-military-religious-freedom; Eric W. Dolan, Christian Democrat Calls on Congress to
Respect Atheists in the Military, RAW STORY (June 16, 2013), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/
2013/06/16/christian-democrat-calls-on-congress-to-respect-atheists-in-the-military/.
17. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2014 was eventually passed as
part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 86–152
(2014).
18. See House Debate, supra note 5, at H4941–43 (prohibiting the use of funding “to
appoint chaplains for the military departments in contravention of” current DOD regula-
tions, which do not recognize atheist chaplains). That amendment did not make the final
consolidated bill. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, 128 Stat. 5.
19. When I refer to the affirmative protection of the Free Exercise Clause, I mean
one’s right to use the Clause to affirmatively seek government accommodations for one’s
religious practices. This is not to deny that the Clause also negatively protects all persons
from government coercion to religious practice.
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ing the free exercise thereof . . . .” 20 This deceptively straightforward
sentence has engendered endless discussion and controversy about
the amendment’s two distinct Religion Clauses. This part of the Arti-
cle briefly discusses how the chaplaincy can constitutionally survive
under the Establishment Clause and frames the two sides of the athe-
ist chaplain debate as presented under the Free Exercise Clause.
A. The Constitutionality of the Chaplain Corps
The constitutional arguments for and against atheist chaplains
must be grounded in an understanding of why the existing military
chaplaincy is constitutional in the first place.21 In short, the chaplain
corps exists primarily as a government accommodation so military
members can freely exercise their religion. Today, the Second Cir-
cuit’s 1985 treatment of the chaplaincy’s constitutionality in Katcoff v.
Marsh22 still stands as the definitive case in this area.
In Katcoff, two Harvard law students challenged the constitution-
ality of the U.S. Army’s chaplain corps.23 They argued that govern-
ment funding of the chaplaincy violated the Establishment Clause and
that a privately funded program would adequately serve any Free Ex-
ercise issues raised by military service.24 The Second Circuit rejected
this argument, finding a private program “inherently impractical” and
noting the unlikelihood that religious denominations in the nation
would “favor, much less financially support, a civilian chaplaincy,” or
that civilian chaplains would submit themselves to the kind of military
discipline that “is essential to the efficient operations of the armed
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. This Article assumes the chaplaincy’s constitutionality and thus discusses the con-
stitutionality issue only briefly when appropriate. For further discussion on the issue, see
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the
Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89 (2007), for an analysis of the chaplaincy as an accommo-
dation under the Free Exercise Clause; Julie B. Kaplan, Military Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestab-
lishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J. 1210 (1986), for a discussion on the
constitutionality of the current chaplaincy program; and Klaus J. Hermann, Some Considera-
tions on the Constitutionality of the United States Military Chaplaincy, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 24
(1964), for a discussion of the chaplaincy’s relationship with, and propriety under, the First
Amendment.
22. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d in part, 755 F.2d 223.
The district court described the challenge as “more the grist of a moot court competition
than a case or controversy.” Id. But it found the students had standing under the Supreme
Court’s taxpayer exception in Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 471. The idea for the law-
suit “came to the plaintiffs during one of their law classes.” See IZRAEL DRAZIN & CECIL B.
CURREY, FOR GOD AND COUNTRY: THE HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
ARMY CHAPLAINCY 2 (1995).
24. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 235.
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forces.”25 In the past, limited experimentation with civilian clergy as
chaplains had proved to be problematic for the military.26
While upholding the military chaplaincy, the Second Circuit de-
cided not to apply the potentially fatal Lemon v. Kurtzman27 test be-
cause it did not take into account the judicial deference required in
the military context; nor did it recognize the unique Free Exercise
context of the chaplaincy issue.28 Instead, the court applied the tradi-
tion-based test of Marsh v. Chambers,29 noting “weighty evidence” that
Congress had authorized the military chaplaincy “before and contem-
poraneous with the adoption of the Establishment Clause,” and that it
had enjoyed an unbroken history for the entirety of the nation’s
existence.30
25. Id. at 236. The court explained:
This discipline demands willingness to undergo thorough military training except
in the use of firearms, to remain with an Army unit for a specified period of time,
to obey orders to move overnight with that unit to other locations, which might
be thousands of miles away, and to advance as ordered on the battlefield and risk
their lives in order to minister to the wounded and dying.
Id. at 236-37.
26. See DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 43. Drazin and Currey describe how civilian
clergy in Vietnam attempted to minister to the troops in the 1960s and argue that the “task
of escorting such visitors hampered the work of military chaplains” and led to various other
problems. Id. But see HERMAN A. NORTON, STRUGGLING FOR RECOGNITION: THE UNITED
STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY 1791–1865, at 44 (1977). Despite this, prior to 1830, civilian
clergy on the frontier “functioned as post chaplains at Fort Brady and Fort Mackinac in
Michigan territory; Fort Crawford and Fort Winnebago, Wisconsin territory; Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas territory; and Fort Snelling, Minnesota territory, the farthest outposts on the
Northwest frontier [and] [t]he same practice existed at several posts in the East.” Id. This
practice, however, was phased out.
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing a three-prong analysis for Establishment Clause
cases). Under Lemon, to meet the requirements of the Establishment Clause: “First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (internal citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Analyzing Lemon’s first prong, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the “ultimate objective” of the chaplaincy was to improve the “morale
of our military personnel”; however, the court went on to conclude that the chaplaincy’s
“immediate purpose is to promote religion by making it available, albeit on a voluntary
basis, to our armed forces.” Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232. Regarding Lemon’s second prong, the
court recognized that the chaplaincy had the effect of “advanc[ing] the practice of relig-
ion.” Id. Under the third prong, the court concluded that the chaplaincy’s “arrangements
with many church organizations of different denominations[ ] entangle[d] the govern-
ment with religious accrediting bodies.” Id.
28. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 235.
29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
30. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S.
at 792).
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The Second Circuit agreed with the government that the Free
Exercise Clause required an Army chaplaincy to ensure that soldiers
would be able to freely exercise their religion when deployed and in
remote locations.31 This was consistent with Army leadership’s belief
that “free exercise was the raison d’etre of the chaplaincy.”32 However,
the Second Circuit was not entirely convinced and partly remanded
the case to determine whether the Constitution would justify the fund-
ing of chaplains in large urban areas where civilian churches were
freely available.33 The district court never resolved that question—and
the Supreme Court never had a chance to review the case—because
the plaintiffs dismissed it after remand.34
Today, the Supreme Court would likely uphold the chaplaincy on
similar grounds, especially in light of its recent decision involving leg-
islative prayer.35 The Supreme Court has often recognized the need to
defer to Congress on military matters36 and has previously upheld fed-
eral accommodations based on the Free Exercise Clause. For exam-
ple, in Cutter v. Wilkinson,37 the Court unanimously upheld the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),38
which applied strict scrutiny to any government action that placed a
substantial burden on a prisoner’s religion.39 In allowing Congress to
31. Id. at 234-35 (“[The Free Exercise Clause] obligates Congress, upon creating an
Army, to make religion available to soldiers who have been moved by the Army to areas of
the world where religion of their own denominations is not available to them. Otherwise
the effect of compulsory military service could be to violate their rights under both Relig-
ion Clauses.”).
32. DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 115.
33. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 237-38.
34. DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 203-05 (relating how Katcoff negotiated a
settlement to avoid legal fees and costs on appeal); see also Rosen, supra note 13, at 1142
(reporting recollections of government litigators in Katcoff).
35. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (reaffirming Marsh
and noting that “the First Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains only days
after approving language for the First Amendment”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 21, at 95-
96 (discussing the reasoning of Katcoff); Rosen, supra note 13, at 1143 (arguing that the
Supreme Court would be unlikely to apply Lemon to the military chaplaincy due to its
historic origins). But see Kaplan, supra note 21, at 1212 (doubting the chaplaincy’s
constitutionality).
36. Judicial deference to Congress and the President in military affairs is commonly
practiced by the Supreme Court. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (up-
holding the Military Selective Service Act); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986) (upholding an Air Force regulation prohibiting members from wearing the Jewish
yarmulke).
37. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
38. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000).
39. See Cutter, 544 U.S. 709.
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protect religious practices, the Court appreciated the tension with the
Establishment Clause but concluded the RLUIPA was a permissible
way for the government to “alleviate exceptional government-created
burdens on private religious exercise.” 40 A similar line of reasoning
could apply to the military situation.41
With the chaplaincy based so firmly in the Free Exercise Clause, it
is no surprise the debate over atheist military chaplains takes on a
similar character.
B. The Nontheist Position Supporting Atheist Chaplains
Those in favor of admitting atheist military chaplains hold an ex-
pansive view about the nature of religion—a vision that includes tradi-
tional sects as well as secular life stances and deeply held philosophies.
Nontheists argue that “[h]umanism fills the same role for atheists that
Christianity does for Christians and Judaism does for Jews . . . . It an-
swers questions of ultimate concern; it directs our values.”42 In es-
sence, they seek Free Exercise protection, including any
accommodations needed to practice their belief while serving in the
military.43 They assert the U.S. Armed Forces contain a significant mi-
nority of nonbelievers—more than those who self-identify as Jewish,
Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist.44 Thus, secularists desire pastoral coun-
seling by those trained in “seminaries who [sic] prepare humanist
chaplains for ordination and work in the field, in hospitals, in univer-
sities, and again in the militaries that have them.”45
40. Id. at 720.
41. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 1146 (arguing that Cutter is more or less analogous to
the military chaplaincy situation because, “like prisoners, members of the armed forces are
largely dependent upon the government to accommodate their religions”).
42. Dao, supra note 11 (quoting Jason Torpy, head of the MAAF) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43. As one Congressman advocated during the Appropriations Act debate: “[T]here
is no political goal or secular agenda here. . . . [W]e should include in the chaplaincy
people who represent the full diversity of the beliefs of the quality of men and women who
serve.” House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D., CO)).
44. See Jason Torpy, Open Letter to Chaplains from Foxhole Atheists, MILITARY ASS’N OF
ATHEISTS & FREETHINKERS (June 22, 2011), http://militaryatheists.org/news/2011/10/
open-letter-to-chaplains-from-humanists/ (arguing that surveys of servicemembers demon-
strate that “Humanists” outnumber non-Christians and members of most Christian denom-
inations, except for Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists). See id. DOD statistics indicate
almost 10,000 active duty military members (out of 1.4 million) self-identify as atheist or
agnostic, while another 285,000 claim “no religious preference”—an amorphous category
that may or may not include more atheists. See Dao, supra note 11. In comparison, about
70% of the active duty force self-identifies as Christian. Id.
45. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D., CO)).
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Nontheists reject the chaplaincy as an exclusively faith-based insti-
tution. Believing that “[r]eligious chaplains are ill equipped to handle
the problems of nontheistic service members,”46 they insist that the
military admit atheists as part of the chaplain corps to provide a chan-
nel where nontheists can go for confidential counsel on existential
questions such as: “Why am I here? What’s the meaning of life? How
do I justify the use of force?”47 They view mental-health counselors as
poor substitutes because their communications enjoy less confidential-
ity than chaplains and because “[t]here is no stigma attached to seek-
ing counsel from a chaplain.”48 They also see no reason why atheists
cannot serve equally well as theist chaplains, especially in light of the
increasingly secularized role of the modern chaplaincy.49
In sum, the secularist position essentially seeks the admission of
atheist chaplains as a religious accommodation under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. Secular groups are beginning to test the bounds of the
current DOD policy by submitting chaplain applications from human-
ist candidates and teeing up constitutional challenges if those applica-
tions are denied.50
46. Nontheists Urge House Committee to Support Nontheist Military Chaplains, SECULAR
COAL. FOR AM. (June 4, 2013), http://secular.org/news/nontheists-urge-house-committee-
support-nontheist-military-chaplains [hereinafter Nontheists Urge House] (quoting Edwina
Rogers, Executive Director of the Secular Coalition for America) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
47. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D., CO)).
48. Nontheists Urge House, supra note 46; see also Pete Kasperowicz, House Kills Dem Pro-
posal Allowing Nonreligious Military Chaplains, THE HILL (June 14, 2013), http://thehill
.com/blogs/floor-action/house/305603-house-kills-dem-proposal-allowing-non-religious-
military-chaplains (noting Rep. Jared Polis’s statement that secular counselors do not “en-
joy the same confidentiality that a chaplain visit does”).
49. See Carroll, supra note 10 (stating that chaplains engage in a wide range of secular
duties).
50. See Jason Torpy, Foxhole Atheists Denounce Congressional Ignorance of Humanist Values,
MILITARY ASS’N OF ATHEISTS & FREETHINKERS (June 7, 2013), http://militaryatheists.org/
news/2013/06/foxhole-atheists-denounce-congressional-ignorance-of-humanist-values/
(“[The MAAF] is currently working with three humanist chaplain [applicants who] fear
they won’t pass this unconstitutional religious test for the public office of the chaplaincy.”);
Carroll, supra note 10 (relating Torpy’s threat to use “legal means to try to force fundamen-
tal change on the chaplain corps”). In May 2014, the Navy apparently met with Jason Torpy
himself as a potential candidate for the Navy Chaplaincy. See Group Preparing to Press Military
for Atheist Chaplain, Source Says, FOX NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/polit-
ics/2014/05/13/group-preparing-to-press-military-for-atheist-chaplain-source-says/.
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C. The Traditional Chaplaincy Position Opposing Atheist
Chaplains
Traditionalists support a traditional, believing chaplaincy and de-
cry the seemingly self-contradictory request from nontheists who re-
ject belief in the existence of deities to be part of an organization that
was historically built precisely on that belief. At the core of this objec-
tion is a resistance to equating faith-based religion with secular philos-
ophies. For instance, during the House of Representatives debate over
the proposed amendment to the NDAA in June 2013, Representative
Tim Huelskamp (R., KS), asked: “How is it that one can hold a relig-
ious service for an organization . . . that does not consider itself to be a
religion? It’s completely contrary to the directions, instructions, and
the very definition of the chaplain corps.”51
Traditionalists also question the secularist premise that religious
chaplains are unable to relate to atheist servicemembers. They argue
that, “[b]ecause chaplains by their nature and calling see others
through a lens of care and compassion, no chaplain would ever turn
any [servicemember] away. There is no litmus test regarding faith or
religious affiliation.”52 They also point out the unique historical role
of the chaplain corps as a Free Exercise accommodation for military
members. If nontheist members wish to get counseling from a secular
perspective, they need only turn to the vast services found in every
part of the military outside the chaplaincy, which is the lone haven for
religious ministry in the armed forces. “The Chaplain Corps is faith-
based, but it should be remembered that there are lots of non-faith-
based helping agencies in the military . . . available to atheists.”53 The
real fear is that the admission of atheists would redefine the chap-
laincy from a faith-based organization to one serving primarily secular
functions.54 In essence, the traditionalist position does not believe the
51. Press Release, Tim Huelskamp, Congressman, “Atheist Chaplain” Idea Panned by
Huelskamp and Rejected by House (June 14, 2013), available at http://huelskamp.house
.gov/media-center/press-releases/atheist-chaplain-idea-panned-by-huelskamp-rejected-by-
house (containing a video of Rep. Tim Huelskamp on floor of House). Rep. John Fleming
expressed similar concerns about atheist chaplains being unable to provide the faith-based
moral support a dying soldier might need. See Katherine Weber, Lawmakers Vote to Oppose
Atheist Chaplains in Military, CHRISTIAN POST (June 6, 2013), http://www.christianpost
.com/news/lawmakers-vote-to-oppose-atheist-chaplains-in-military-97478/.
52. Carroll, supra note 10 (quoting Major General Richardson, former Air Force
Chief of Chaplains) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. (quoting Major General Richardson) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Weber, supra note 51. For instance, Rep. John Fleming worried that accepting
atheists “would make a mockery of the chaplaincy.” Id.
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Free Exercise Clause requires atheist chaplains as a religious accom-
modation for nontheist servicemembers.
With the battle lines drawn, and atheist chaplain candidates al-
ready applying and being rejected,55 this Article explores the relative
merits of these arguments under the Free Exercise Clause.
II. Atheist Chaplains and the Meaning of the Term Religion
The demand for atheist military chaplains has triggered confu-
sion about the meaning of commonly accepted words, such as religion.
Stanford University’s announcement about its atheist chaplain in 2012
prompted a similar debate, with some praising the decision as
“broaden[ing] the conversation about ‘belief’ and ‘unbelief,’”56 and
others despairing that “[w]hen words and terms mean whatever peo-
ple want, we lose common frames of reference.”57 This part of the
Article explores that thorny issue by examining the nature of religion
and arguing that, while atheism is not eligible for accommodation
under the Free Exercise Clause, the rights of atheists should be, and
are, protected by other provisions of the Constitution.
A. Is There an Official Meaning of the Term Religion?
The First Amendment does not define the term religion. Some
scholars question whether it is possible or even desirable to provide
such a definition.58 To be certain, this Article will not resolve the mat-
ter but will merely plot some waypoints on the definition map and
55. See John Burnett, Should Military Chaplains Have to Believe in God?, NPR (July 31,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/31/207320123/should-military-chaplains-have-to-be
lieve-in-god; Kimberly Winston, Humanists Want a Military Chaplain to Call Their Own, RELIG-
ION NEWS SERV. (July 22, 2013), http://www.religionnews.com/2013/07/22/humanists-
want-a-military-chaplain-to-call-their-own/ (interviewing Humanist chaplain candidate Ja-
son Heap). In May 2014, the Navy formally rejected the application of humanist chaplain
candidate Jason Heap. Adelle M. Banks, Navy Rejects Request for First Humanist Chaplain,
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (June 3, 2014), http://www.religionnews.com/2014/06/03/navy-re
jects-request-first-humanist-chaplain/.
56. Alan Jones, John Figdor Appoined [sic] as Atheist Chaplain at Stanford, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-jones/an-atheist-chapaincy-a-
good-way-to-begin-the-new-year_b_2366663.html. Alan Jones, Dean Emeritus for Grace Ca-
thedral, found the news of an atheist chaplain at Stanford “very encouraging, if a bit con-
fusing.” Id.
57. Wesley J. Smith, Stanford Gets an Atheist ‘Chaplain,’ NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 22,
2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/336371/stanford-gets-atheist-chaplain-wes
ley-j-smith (calling Stanford’s move the “latest example of the ongoing postmodern assault
on the meaning of language”).
58. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
763 (1984) (“[T]he very phrase ‘definition of religion’ is potentially misleading.”).
406 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
offer some thoughts on dealing with the term in the context of the
atheist chaplain debate.
1. Considering the Original Meaning of the Term Religion
In defining the word religion, the logical starting place should be
the text of the First Amendment, which uses the term only once:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”59 What did the Framers
mean when they used and understood the term in this context? The
significance of this question will vary, depending on one’s perspective
as an originalist or non-originalist. But three points should provide
sufficient perspective regarding the original language, whatever value
one finds there.
Most notably, the first Congress debated the issue and decided
not to expand the First Amendment’s protection to all rights of con-
science. “Compelling” evidence suggests the Framers rejected a ver-
sion of the Religion Clauses that would have covered secular
conscience rights and chose instead to favor only “the narrower cate-
gory of religion.”60 The record is not sufficient to rule out alternative
theories about why Congress acted in this way; however, the most
plausible explanation is that the Framers intended solely to cover re-
ligious rights.61 What does that mean in the end? Simply that the Re-
ligion Clauses were not initially designed as a means to protect purely
secular ideas, such as that of conscience.
Just as significant, the Framers chose to use the term religion only
once to join both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. This
indicates the intent to use the same meaning of the term in both
clauses and argues against a “dual definition.”62 Justice Rutledge ex-
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Eduardo Pen˜alver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802–04 (1997);
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1481 (1990).
61. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 338
(1996) (“[I]t is hard to draw much meaning from [Congress’s] failure to include a con-
science clause [in the First Amendment, but] when the Founders thought of religion, they
thought of theism.”); see also Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 803 (concluding the original intent
of the Framers was to define religion in the everyday usage of the word, and that it is quite
plausible they purposely chose to limit the coverage of the First Amendment to definition
of the term).
62. See Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 758 (recognizing the need for a unitary defini-
tion, but championing a looser unitary approach with significant flexibility); Note, Toward
a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1085 (1978) (embracing a dual
definition, but noting that a unitary definition “would avoid the irony that inheres in any
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plained in his Everson v. Board of Education63 dissent why a dual mean-
ing was not plausible.64 The logical result of this unity may not please
all scholars, but even some who dislike it admit “we cannot repudiate
[the Framers’] decision without rejecting an essential feature of con-
stitutionalism, rendering all constitutional rights vulnerable to repudi-
ation if they go out of favor.”65
Third, although the Framers lived during the Enlightenment,
and held various religious (and nonreligious) perspectives, when they
used the word religion they had theism in mind.66 As one scholar put
it: “There is little, if any, evidence that the Framers, ratifiers, or ordi-
nary members of the public understood the meaning of religion to
encompass nontheistic views.”67 This does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that the Framers would have limited coverage of the First
Amendment only to Western religious traditions had they been forced
to address the issue.68 But they surely would not have placed atheism
and other forms of nonbelief under the umbrella of religion. This
may be one of the reasons some scholars have spent so much time
trying to escape the original meaning of religion in search of alterna-
tive definitions under the Religion Clauses.69 In any event, the
dual approach which embraces a progressive, modern understanding of religion in one
context and harkens back to a more traditional definition in another”).
63. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
64. See id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Rutledge explained:
[The word] “[r]eligion” appears only once in the [First] Amendment. But the
word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two
meanings, one narrow to forbid “an establishment” and another, much broader,
for securing “the free exercise thereof.” “Thereof” brings down “religion” with its
entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second
guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning
the one as they are regarding the other.
Id.
65. Laycock, supra note 61 at 314 (“For whatever reason, the Constitution does give
special protection to liberty in the domain of religion.”).
66. See id. at 338 (conceding that the Framers viewed the common meaning of the
word religion as theistic when they used the word in the First Amendment); Pen˜alver, supra
note 60, at 803 (noting the Framers may have defined the term religion as encompassing
only theistic beliefs).
67. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1405
(2012).
68. See Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 804 (“The Framers probably never considered the
issue of defining religion for the First Amendment at all, because they thought the every-
day meaning of the term was clear. Indeed, there is no way to distinguish original intent to
apply the First Amendment to religion in the everyday sense of that word (at any given
point in time) from original intent to apply the First Amendment to a particular, theistic
definition of religion. The two were, for the Framers, one and the same thing.”).
69. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 339 (arguing the originalist view will “exclude
nontheists from the goal of government neutrality,” leading us to either “expand the tex-
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originalist argument bolsters the position of traditional supporters of
the military chaplaincy, who would exclude atheism from the defini-
tion of religion.
2. The Supreme Court and the Meaning of the Term Religion
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the meaning of the term relig-
ion has been at best inconsistent. Typically, the Court discusses the
Religion Clauses without attempting to place any definition at all on
the term.70 And when the Court finally did give a definition in 1890,
not surprisingly it used starkly theistic terms. In Davis v. Beason71—a
case involving the Mormon Church and the crimes of bigamy and po-
lygamy—a unanimous Supreme Court defined the term this way: “ref-
erence to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and
of obedience to his will.”72 The Supreme Court continued to approve
of similar theistic views of religion until the 1960s.73
The Court took a new direction in Torcaso v. Watkins74 by unani-
mously striking down a Maryland religious oath test that required can-
didates for public office to declare belief in God.75 Justice Black wrote
for the Court that government cannot force anyone “‘to profess a be-
lief or disbelief in any religion.’ Neither can [it] constitutionally pass
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can [it] aid those religions based on a belief in
tual meaning of ‘religion’ to include the new answers to religious questions, or . . . [to]
shrink the textual meaning of ‘exercise’ to avoid preferring theistic beliefs with respect to
conscientious objection”); Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1403 (arguing that if religion is
“not special” or not “distinctive[ ],” then, under an originalist view, the Religion Clauses
are “morally defective” since they treat religion as special and distinct).
70. See Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 794 (noting the Court generally uses the word relig-
ion nonreflectively, as though the term were self-defining).
71. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
72. Id. at 342. The Court distinguished “religion” from the “form of worship of a
particular sect” and noted that the First Amendment is “intended to allow every one . . . to
entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as
may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such
form of worship as he may think proper . . . .” Id. The Court stated that accepting the
Mormon advocacy of bigamy and polygamy as “a tenet of religion” would “shock the moral
judgment of the community.” Id. at 341–42. Of course, this view should come as no sur-
prise in light of the word’s original meaning and the historic homogeneity of the nation as
Christian.
73. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (“We are a Christian
people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging
with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God.”).
74. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
75. Id.
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the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs.”76 In a footnote, the Court drew from nonlegal sources and
noted that “[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism,77 Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others.”78
In a pair of cases four years later, the Supreme Court in dicta
interpreted a statutory definition of “religious training and belief”
found in the Universal Military Training and Service Act,79 and di-
vined what Congress intended to cover as a proper basis for conscien-
tious objection. In United States v. Seeger,80 the Court concluded the
crux of Congress’s definition was “whether a given belief that is sin-
cere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor paral-
lel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption.”81 The Court was careful to note this stat-
utory interpretation did not address the issue of atheism.82 In Welsh v.
United States,83 the Court expanded on its statutory interpretation in
76. Id. at 495.
77. Although the Court referenced Buddhism and other Eastern religions, it is not
clear those religions should be labeled nontheistic in the same sense as atheism. In a later
case, Justice Douglas elaborated at length on some of the nontraditional religions in the
world, focusing especially on Hinduism and Buddhism. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 188-93 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring). He explained how even Buddhists can be
said to believe in God, depending on how the term is defined. Id.
78. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. The Court also favorably cited the theistic Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), case (among others), which had “thoroughly explored . . . the
First Amendment, the reasons for it, and the scope of the religious freedom it protects.” Id.
at 492.
79. Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612, 613 (1948) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (1958)) (defining “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code”).
80. 380 U.S. 163.
81. Id. at 165-66 (noting Congress’s definition “merely clarifi[ed] the meaning of re-
ligious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views”).
82. Id. at 173-74 (“The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic
beliefs. We do not deal with or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases.”). But
in its discussion of “a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs
found among us,” the Court quoted from various religious sources, including an authority
on the Ethical Culture Movement, Dr. David Saville. Id. Dr. Saville explained that “the God
that we love is not the figure on the great white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned
by faith, of humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements which retard its progress
toward the knowledge, love and practice of the right.” Id. at 183 (quoting DAVID SAVILLE
MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION (1951) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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Seeger and found that certain beliefs “function as a religion” in life if
“an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethi-
cal or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon
him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at
any time.”84 Although these were statutory interpretations, some legal
scholars glimpse a constitutional underpinning in the Court’s
reasoning.85
In any event, the Supreme Court backed away from this expansive
view of religion just two years later. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,86 the Court
recognized that religion possesses a quality that distinguishes it from
secular beliefs and philosophies:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be inter-
posed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is
based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious be-
lief. . . . Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular val-
ues accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.87
This apparent departure from the Court’s recent views of religion
was not lost on a dissenting Justice Douglas, who saw the Court’s “re-
treat[ ]” on religion as contrary to the holding in Seeger.88 It is possible
the majority narrowed their “conception of religion” because the Jus-
tices began to realize “the problematic implications” of the Seeger and
Welsh language.89
84. Id. at 339-40 (“‘[I]ntensely personal’ convictions which some might find ‘incom-
prehensible’ or ‘incorrect’ come within the meaning of ‘religious belief’ in the Act.”).
Justice Harlan subscribed to the majority’s definition of religion under the First Amend-
ment but believed Congress had subscribed to a more traditional definition, as articulated
in a Ninth Circuit case that had conceived of religion “in theistic terms.” Id. at 345 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (citing Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380-381 (9th Cir. 1946)).
85. Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1417-18 (calling the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of religion in Seeger and Welsh “a stretch (and perhaps then some)” but recognizing
that perhaps “the Court was concerned about constitutional infirmities arising from the
exclusion of those with ethical and moral views not grounded in traditional religious be-
liefs”); see also Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 760–61 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s broad statu-
tory construction of religion, as well as its decision in Torcaso, has led other courts and
scholars to assume that the constitutional definition of religion is now much more exten-
sive than it once appeared to be.”).
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. Id. at 215-16.
88. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 798.
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Since Yoder, the Court has made references that some interpret as
an affirmation of the notion that purely secular philosophies could be
defined as religion. In Wallace v. Jaffree,90 the majority explained that
the Court “[a]t one time” had thought the right to choose a creed
“would not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel . . .
[or] the atheist”; however, the Court had now “unambiguously con-
cluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the
First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or
none at all.”91 The Court has also said the “touchstone” of the Estab-
lishment Clause is “that the ‘First Amendment mandates government
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.’”92
These quotes prove the Religion Clauses shield atheists from the-
ism, but they also illustrate that the Court draws a distinction between
the religious and the nonreligious, as when the Court noted in 1989
that “[a] secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its
official creed.”93 Indeed, the Court’s most recent ruling in the area
unanimously recognized that the First Amendment “gives special solic-
itude to the rights of religious organizations.”94 To be certain, the Re-
ligion Clauses protect nontheists from government coercion to
believe in a deity, but that is not necessarily because atheism is a relig-
ion deserving of special protection in its own right under the Free
Exercise Clause. To the contrary, this may simply mean that theism is a
90. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
91. Id. at 53.
92. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
93. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989).
94. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012). The Court recognized a First Amendment ministerial exception for religious
organizations that take employment actions against minister-employees. Id. The Court re-
jected the argument that the Religion Clauses “have nothing to say about a religious organ-
ization’s freedom to select its own ministers,” but that religions organizations could still
take refuge in the implicit First Amendment right to freedom of association. Id. (quoting
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In rejecting this argument as untenable, a unanimous court stated:
[F]reedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike.
It follows under the EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis
should be the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran Church,
a labor union, or a social club. That result is hard to square with the text of the
First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses
have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own
ministers.
Id.
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religion that cannot be forced upon anyone under the Establishment
Clause.
B. Scholarly Debate and the Broadening of the Meaning of the
Term Religion
To recap, there is not yet an authoritative, official meaning of the
term religion. The Framers viewed religion in theistic terms under a
single definition. For its part, the Supreme Court has sent mixed sig-
nals, struggling to maintain a distinction between belief and nonbelief
while at the same time respecting the nation’s growing religious diver-
sity.95 This lack of clear authority has led to vigorous debate among
scholars about how the word religion ought to be interpreted.
The scholarly literature reflects some dissatisfaction with the orig-
inal view of religion accepted by the courts for the first 150 years of
the nation’s history.96 Although the push to expand the idea of relig-
ion originated in nonlegal academic circles,97 legal scholars have now
developed their own theories with distinctive contours.98 The most
far-reaching of these views would abandon the original definition of
religion and broaden the term to embrace atheism, agnosticism, and
humanism.99 Others seek a middle road that could embrace nontradi-
95. See Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 811 (criticizing the “dictionary-style definition” of
religion, which often implies a purely theistic view of the meaning of the term religion, even
when used by the U.S. Supreme Court).
96. See id. at 803–04 (“[A]n exclusive reliance on original intent would mandate the
adoption of the Framers’ theistic definition of religion, . . . [which] would be inconsistent
with the evolutionary nature of language and would raise serious establishment con-
cerns.”). Professors Kent Greenawalt and Eduardo Pen˜alver have written excellent articles
in this area that provide helpful critiques of these approaches to defining religion, while
rejecting a strict originalist philosophy. See id.; Greenawalt, supra note 58.
97. See Tebbe, supra note 4, at 1132-35. Professor Tebbe reviewed several nonlegal
academic theories on how to define religion, including a functionalist and substantive ap-
proach. Id. A functional approach takes a societal focus, viewing religion as having “the
power to delineate and unify communities and even whole societies.” Id. at 1132. A sub-
stantive approach, which has won greater academic support, defines religion more con-
cretely as “a system of communal beliefs and practices relative to superhuman beings.” Id.
at 1134 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONS 915 (Wendy
Doniger ed., 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Both approaches broaden the
concept of religion beyond the theism accepted by most Americans at the time the Fram-
ers drafted the Constitution.
98. In one of the earliest discussions on how to define the term religion in the Religion
Clauses, Dean Choper provides an elaborate critique of various theories such as “ultimate
concerns” and “extratemporal consequences.” See Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the
First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 599 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1416. Schwartzman wants to loosen the “inter-
pretive constraints imposed by originalist (and textualist) theories of constitutional inter-
pretation” for a non-originalist reconciliation of “the Religion Clauses with the view that
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tional religions while maintaining a distinction between belief and un-
belief. The result of this debate has been the creation of single-factor
and multi-factor approaches to this thorny question.
Modern single-factor100 approaches seek to broaden the legal
idea of religion beyond the Western bias of the Framers by isolating a
single factor that separates the religious from the secular. For in-
stance, the ultimate concern approach, inspired by the Supreme
Court’s discussion in Seeger and Welsh, suggests that “when a person
sincerely holds beliefs dealing with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ that
for her occupy a ‘place parallel to that filled by . . . God in tradition-
ally religious persons,’ those beliefs represent her religion.”101 The
Seventh Circuit used this method to treat atheism as a religion in a
prisoner Free Exercise case.102 The ultimate concern theory has been
widely criticized as “fundamentally flawed,”103 however, because
“[n]ot only can religion be present without ultimate concern; matters
that are not religious may involve ultimate concerns.”104
religion is not normatively distinctive.” Id. at 1414-15; see also Toward a Constitutional Defini-
tion of Religion, supra note 62 (arguing for an expansive definition of religion when interpret-
ing the Free Exercise Clause and a narrow definition when interpreting the Establishment
Clause).
100. Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 802-11 (identifying three such single factors—look-
ing for a “Supreme Being,” “ultimate concern,” and a “higher reality”—and attacking each
as inadequate to address the complexities of the question under the Religion Clauses).
Professor Eduardo Pen˜alver has broken these definitions into two categories. See Pen˜alver,
supra note 60, at 794. The “functional approach” broadly defines religion as embracing the
“ultimate concern” of an individual, while the “content-based” approach looks for “some
essence within all religious belief systems according to which such systems can be distin-
guished from nonreligious belief systems” such as a belief in “extra-temporal consequences
to human action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Choper, supra note 98, at
593-97 (discussing various approaches, including the ultimate concern approach).
101. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fleischfresser
v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir.1994)) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. at 682. The court waded through the ambiguous Supreme Court references on
the topic and concluded “the Supreme Court has recognized atheism as equivalent to a
‘religion’ for purposes of the First Amendment on numerous occasions.” Id. at 682. In
dealing with the language in Yoder, the court merely noted that the Supreme Court had
distinguished religion from “a ‘way of life,’ even if that way of life is inspired by philosophi-
cal beliefs or other secular concerns.” Id. 681 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215 (1972)). Looking at its own precedent, the court noted that it had previously accepted
that “atheism may be considered, in this specialized sense, a religion.” Id. at 682 (citing
Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)).
103. Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 806.
104. Id. at 810; see also Choper, supra note 98, at 595 (discussing the difficulties with the
ultimate concern approach); Pen˜alver, supra note 60 (rejecting the ultimate concern
approach).
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Perhaps the “most plausible single-factor approach” asks whether
a would-be religion believes in some higher reality.105 “Under this ap-
proach, the essential feature of religion is faith in something beyond
the mundane observable world—faith that some higher or deeper re-
ality exists than that which can be established by ordinary existence or
scientific observation.”106 This approach is broad enough to embrace
non-Western religions “that claim the apparent world is unreal and
true meaning is ‘immanent’ rather than transcendent,” yet narrow
enough to reject as “nonreligious the activities of groups, such as Ethi-
cal Culture, that engage in practices closely resembling the worship
services of the traditional religions but that do not assert a realm of
meaning inaccessible to ordinary observation.”107
The trend among modern scholars has been to reject a single-
factor approach in favor of a multi-factor “methodology for deciding if
a belief system is or is not a religion, rather than a definition in the
dictionary sense.”108 The most accepted of these methodologies has
become known as the analogical approach.109 This methodology iden-
tifies “instances to which the concept [of religion] indisputably ap-
plies” and then compares “in more doubtful instances how close the
analogy is between these and the indisputable instances.”110 Some
scholars appreciate the “virtues” of this methodology: “It is flexible
and nuanced, and it resonates with [a] broader eclectic theory of re-
ligious freedom.”111 Others have made their own refinements to the
methodology but always with the intent to broaden the scope of relig-
105. Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 805.
106. Id. Greenawalt, while ultimately rejecting this approach, felt it was a strong single-
factor approach because it included “not only belief in a ‘transcendent’ reality, but also the
belief that all truth is to be found within oneself once layers of illusion are peeled away.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 794 (citing George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided
Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1534-48 (1983)); Green-
awalt, supra note 58, at 763 (“[A]ny dictionary approach oversimplifies the concept of
religion . . . .”).
109. Although the analogical approach was first defined by Judge Adams of the Third
Circuit in 1979, courts have used some type of analogical approach going back as far as the
late 1950s. Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 771 (“A careful examination of past borderline
cases indicates that the courts have been employing an analogical strategy for some time,
rarely starting with a settled definition of religion but comparing the debated belief, activ-
ity, or organization with what is undeniably religious.”).
110. Id. at 763 (“[The analogical approach] can yield applications of the concept to
instances that share no common feature, a result that the dictionary approach pre-
cludes.”). Pen˜alver suggests that judges should use analogical baselines from religions iden-
tified as pantheistic, theistic, and nontheistic. See Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 817-18.
111. Tebbe, supra note 4, at 1137.
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ion it embraces.112 Indeed, those who have adopted the analogical
method are also more likely to consider atheism a religion.113
It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate all the merits of
these theories; however, even the newest thoughts about religion
should keep faith with the original understanding of the Religion
Clauses. Scholars have demonstrated it is possible to construct defini-
tions of religion that broaden the concept in principled ways, thereby
giving academics and judges many tools from which to choose when
examining the nature of religion under the Free Exercise Clause.
These constructs widen the definition even to the point of including
atheism.114 Yet none of these approaches seems to perfectly capture
the elusive concept of religion.
A narrower approach—even an imperfect one, such as Higher
Reality—is a better path to defining religion under the First Amend-
ment than the broader, multi-factor approaches. Considering the
Framers’ original view of religion—backed by the Supreme Court for
the first 170 years of the nation’s history—it seems that any newly
adopted approach must be narrow enough to maintain that crucial
distinction between religion and nonreligion. Otherwise, we ignore
112. As one modification, Pen˜alver offers “negative guidelines” to help deal with any
Western bias toward religion:
First, religious status may not be denied to a belief system because of its failure to
contain a concept of God (or gods). Second, religious status may not be denied to
a belief system because of its particular structural characteristics or lack of institu-
tional features (for example, clergy or organized worship). Third, religious status
may not be denied to a belief system because of its failure to focus on or distin-
guish the sacred, spiritual, supernatural, or other-worldly.
Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 818. Using this approach, Pen˜alver concludes that Marxism
would not satisfy the criteria as a religion. Id. at 820-21.
113. See Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 793-94 (“If the establishment clause is under-
stood as barring government from sponsoring claims of truth in the domain of religion,
then antireligious ideas may be understood as a subset of religious ideas.”); Tebbe, supra
note 4, at 1149 (arguing that, under some circumstances, atheism should be considered a
religion); Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1421–22 (advocating for an expansion of the
term religion to include all types of secular views).
114. Laycock has argued that atheism must be a religion because it offers answers to
religious questions such as: “What is the nature of God and what does He/She want for
us?” Laycock, supra note 61, at 326-27.
[Religion] is any set of answers to religious questions, including the negative and
skeptical answers of atheists, agnostics, and secularists. . . . “No God exists and this
imaginary construct wants nothing for us” is a belief about religion. It is not
merely a descriptive statement about religion, such as an anthropologist might
make, or a scholar of comparative religion. Rather, it is an affirmation of belief,
capable of generating commitment and even lifelong activism on behalf of the
cause.
Id.
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the Framers’ original choice to reject a general conscience protec-
tion.115 Our adopted approach must be broad enough, however, to
embrace diverse religions from all traditions—not just the West.116 An
approach such as Higher Reality would not be inconsistent with the
Framers’ views. Although most of the Framers embraced religion in its
Western forms—including non-Christian faiths such as Deism—they
clearly recognized the existence of starkly different religious traditions
in the world. For instance, the American colonists were familiar with
the Hindu religion because the British had been trading with and col-
onizing India for almost 200 years at the time of the First Amend-
ment’s passage.117
C. Applying a Narrower Definition: Atheism as Nonreligion
The atheist chaplain debate cuts to the heart of the definitional
problems noted earlier. The confusion inherent in this inquiry was on
full display during the House debate on the proposed amendment to
the NDAA to require atheist chaplains, with some arguing that atheists
“don’t believe anything.”118 Nontheists have worked hard to dispel
this mistaken notion. Secular groups have built foundations for ethics
and morality that are devoid of any reference to the divine, the im-
mortal soul, or deity-based incentives.119 They have also developed
“comprehensive, secular, reason-based alternatives to the religion-
115. See Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1405-06 (“[T]here is substantial evidence that
the Founders did not intend either of the Religion Clauses to protect atheist beliefs.”). But
see Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 804 (arguing that, because the Framers likely did not seri-
ously question the meaning of religion, the term is ambiguous).
116. Pen˜alver believes that “an exclusive reliance on original intent would mandate the
adoption of the Framers’ theistic definition of religion,” Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 803, a
possibility he believes “would be inconsistent with the evolutionary nature of language and
would raise serious establishment concerns.” Id. at 804.
117. See THE REGISTER OF LETTERS &C. OF THE GOVERNOUR AND COMPANY OF MERCHANTS
OF LONDON TRADING INTO THE EAST INDIES: 1600–1619 (Sir George Birdwood ed., 1893)
(discussing Hinduism).
118. Weber, supra note 51. During that debate, Mike Conaway (R., TX) argued, “You
can’t use the word chaplain with atheists because they don’t believe anything.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). This drew a stinging reply from Rep. Adam Smith (D., WA),
who called the comment “just ignorant,” and pointed out that atheists and humanists have
strongly held beliefs and values, similar to those found in religions such as Christianity.
Atheist Chaplains Would Call Fallen Soldiers ‘Worm Food,’ GOP Congressman Says (VIDEO), HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/05/atheist-chap
lains-worm-food_n_3393122.html.
119. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 336 (“[The nontheist] belief in transcendent moral
obligations . . . is analogous to the transcendent moral obligations that are part of the
cluster of theistic beliefs that we recognize as religious.”).
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based life.”120 But does it make sense to include such groups under
the definition of religion? This Part of the Article discusses that ques-
tion and addresses two common objections to excluding atheism from
religion.
1. The Benefits of a Narrower Definition
Applying a narrower definition—such as the Higher Reality ap-
proach—to nontheist views would likely exclude those philosophies
from the ambit of religion.121 But there are sound reasons to adopt
this approach, even if it classifies nontheism as nonreligion.
First, a narrower definition is more consistent with the original
intent and understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. The Framers’
concept of religion surely ruled out theories of nonbelief and never
envisioned the Free Exercise Clause as an affirmative protection for
atheists.122 Second, there are thoughtful modern approaches that pro-
vide theoretical constructs that can reasonably delineate between the
religious and the nonreligious. The Higher Reality approach in partic-
ular seems expansive enough to accommodate modern sensibilities
while keeping faith with the Framers’ views.123 Third, in the ongoing
culture wars over the past forty years, secularists have often resisted
being labeled as members of a religion.124 This more recent change in
120. Mary Jean Dolan, Cautious Contextualism: A Response to Nelson Tebbe’s Nonbelievers, 98
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 32, 34-35 (2012) (noting that “‘New Atheists’ have taken center stage
with their flamboyant mission to disprove and denigrate religion” but recognizing that the
atheism of those seeking an alternative philosophy to religion is “hard to distinguish from
the ‘religion’ of the unaffiliated, yet (often quite vaguely) spiritual”).
121. The higher reality theory sees the “essential feature of religion” as “faith that some
higher or deeper reality exists than that which can be established by ordinary existence or
scientific observation.” Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 805. This contradicts the distinctive
nontheist rejection of both the supernatural and higher levels of existence outside the
observable universe. Thus, the higher reality approach would likely label atheism as
nonreligion.
122. See supra Part II.A.1.
123. See supra notes 105-107, 115-117, and accompanying text.
124. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 329 (detailing the history of the modern culture
wars and noting that “the religious right began to argue that secular humanism is a relig-
ion and that it is established in the schools, and the organized humanist movement began
to respond that it is not a religion after all”). This is significant only because a group’s own
rejection of the religion label could impact whether a court will view it as such. See Ctr. for
Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Circuit Court, 2012 WL 5997721, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30,
2012). (“[Plaintiff, Center for Inquiry (“CFI”), a secular humanist organization,] stipulated
that CFI is not a religion. . . . The group’s recurrent insistence that it is not a religion
forecloses the analysis they have entreated the Court to make. We must therefore treat CFI
precisely as we would any other non-religious entity.”).
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position seeking inclusion as a religion could be viewed as a tactical
decision for litigation purposes.
In any event, if religion can no longer be distinguished from
nonreligion, then the Religion Clauses would seem to protect nothing
special. Using a narrower definition of religion strikes the proper bal-
ance by taking into account the religious diversity of the modern
world while also resisting the temptation to totally redefine constitu-
tional terms.
2. Addressing the Establishment Clause Objection
Some legal scholars raise an objection to a narrower definition of
religion due to Establishment Clause concerns. They fear the exclu-
sion of atheism from the ambit of religion will logically lead to an-
other type of undesirable establishment. Under their worst-case
scenario, the government would be permitted to establish atheism as
the state’s favored religion or philosophy,125 and the only protection
for religious persons would be other aspects of the First Amend-
ment.126 To avoid this possibility, they argue the word religion must
outgrow its traditional boundaries and include atheism. But there are
other ways to address this objection.
The valid concern these scholars raise is essentially based on a
formalistic reading of the Establishment Clause—an approach the Su-
preme Court is not eager to adopt. Although not required by the
text’s technical wording, recall that the touchstone of the Establish-
ment Clause is “the principle that the First Amendment mandates gov-
ernment neutrality between religion and religion, and between
125. Professor Laycock puts the problem in stark terms: “Government could teach
atheism in the schools, promote atheism in the mass media, subsidize the American Athe-
ists and a network of local chapters, and ridicule God as the opiate of the masses.” Laycock,
supra note 61, at 330. Professor Laycock also claimed that
[i]f atheism is not a religion for constitutional purposes, such an establishment
would be perfectly constitutional. . . . If atheism is just a secular idea, government
would be free to promote atheism to the same extent that it has ever promoted
any other secular idea—say the war effort in World War II, or civil rights during
the Second Reconstruction.
Id.; see also Schwartzman, supra note 67, at 1422 (positing a similar hypothetical and noting
the Establishment Clause must prevent the state from promoting “major schools of mod-
ern ethical thought, such as Kantianism and utilitarianism,” because otherwise the state
would have “established a secular doctrine” in violation of the First Amendment).
126. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 330 (“The Free Speech Clause would protect citizens
from being forced to affirm atheistic beliefs, and the Free Exercise Clause would protect
believers from persecution or discrimination.”); Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 793
(“[P]ublic sponsorship of atheism should be treated as raising only free exercise claims in
those who profess religion.”).
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religion and nonreligion.”127 Adopting atheism as an official philoso-
phy would not be an example of this neutrality. Instead of redefining
the word religion, the same result can be reached by focusing on the
words respecting and establishment.
If the government were to adopt atheism as its philosophy, Su-
preme Court precedent would find it had taken action respecting an
establishment of religion. Adoption of nonbelief is an establishment
against religion, and a step toward atheism would be an action respect-
ing this forbidden establishment. As the Court itself has said, “[a] sec-
ular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an atheistic or
antireligious state. A secular state establishes neither atheism nor re-
ligion as its official creed.”128 But even if this worst-case scenario could
survive an Establishment Clause analysis, government action adopting
atheism might not be allowed under the Free Exercise Clause. An offi-
cial policy that rejects religion and advocates nonbelief might create
an environment that would make it substantially difficult for Ameri-
cans to freely exercise their religious rights. In short, worries about an
establishment of atheism are unnecessary. There are ways to deal with
that problem other than to redefine the word religion.
Indeed, interpreting religion to include atheism may lead to the
opposite concern in future Establishment Clause cases. Recall how vigi-
lantly the courts have policed this area of the law, especially in the
debate about teaching scientific creation principles in the public
schools, even if all mention of God is removed.129 Courts have struck
down seemingly harmless disclaimers about the theory of evolution
because they have feared it might promote Biblical beliefs.130 Thus, if
127. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (internal citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
128. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989).
129. Traditional creationism espouses the biblical view that God created the world in
seven days. See Genesis 1–2. Some modern creationists exclude explicit references to God
while advocating against the idea of a purely random evolutionary theory. See Antony B.
Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819,
879 (2007). In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), the Court struck down a Louisiana
policy allowing for the teaching of creation science despite a nonreligious definition—a
move that led a dissenting Justice Scalia to accuse the majority of suppressing the views of
scientists simply because of their personal religious beliefs, id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 185 F.3d 337, 438 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the decision to bar a
school “from even suggesting to students that other theories besides evolution—including,
but not limited to, the Biblical theory of creation—are worthy of their consideration”);
Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (finding a
sticker placed in a biology textbook that stated: “Evolution is a theory, not a fact, concern-
ing the origin of living things” violated the Establishment Clause), reversed by 449 F.3d 1320
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secular philosophies such as Marxism or humanism were included
under the umbrella of religion, some courts might be overly protec-
tive and prevent teaching those topics in public school as viable ways
to interpret history.
In sum, Establishment Clause worries do not provide a compel-
ling basis to redefine religion. A narrower definition can be used with-
out fear of the secular establishment of atheism.
3. Addressing the Special Protection Objection
Some scholars have also objected to a narrower definition of re-
ligion on fairness grounds by arguing the Constitution should not pro-
vide special rights to believers over nonbelievers.131 In particular, the
equal liberty approach claims that “religion should be subject to
neither extraordinary protections nor extraordinary burdens in
law.”132 This objection can be answered in at least four ways to help
understand why religion should receive special protection over
nonreligion.
First, the decision to protect a special subset of Americans was a
considered value judgment the Framers felt was necessary to avoid
government oppression, after intentionally rejecting a broader secular
conscience protection.133 This judgment was not made in a vacuum:
religious persecution had an unfortunate historical pedigree familiar
to the Framers.134
(11th Cir. 2006). Selman was later settled in favor of the plaintiffs. See Mike Rich, Textbooks
Disclaimed or Evolution Denied: A Constitutional Analysis of Textbook Disclaimer Policies and Aca-
demic Freedom Acts, 63 ALA. L. REV. 641, 644 n.21 (2012).
131. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 67.
132. Tebbe, supra note 4, at 1142 (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of religious freedom
are best read as requiring government evenhandedness toward all deep and valuable com-
mitments.”). Under this view, it seems unfair to favor one subset of believing Americans
while not affording the same protection to another subset with beliefs that seem analogous
on the philosophical questions of human life. Laycock has argued that
religious beliefs may evolve from theism to deism to modernism to resymbolized
Christianity to humanism to agnosticism to atheism. This evolution is itself an
exercise of religion; it is a series of religious choices or of shifting religious com-
mitments. The state should not draw a line across this evolutionary path. . . .
Laycock, supra note 61, at 336.
133. See supra Part II.A.1; Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 802 (citing “the original intent of
the Framers and the text of the Constitution itself” as a reason to limit “the protection
extended by the Religion Clauses to religion as the term is used in everyday language”).
134. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 317 (noting that “governmental attempts to suppress
disapproved religious views had caused vast human suffering in Europe and in England
and similar suffering on a smaller scale in the colonies that became the United States” and
that one goal of the Religion Clauses was to “minimize this conflict”); Pen˜alver, supra note
60, at 802 (citing “the history of religiously motivated violence and the vulnerability of
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Second, the Constitution should offer special protection when
government legislates in the area of religion because it lacks a legiti-
mate interest in regulating religious practices and “beliefs about theol-
ogy, liturgy, and church governance,” especially when juxtaposed with
the weighty interest historically demonstrated by individuals who have
found religion “important enough to die for, to suffer for, to rebel
for, to emigrate for.”135 Again, in light of past and present discrimina-
tion against religion, it makes sense to continue to give religion spe-
cial protection from government regulation.136
Third, the Religion Clauses are not the most logical place to find
protections for nontheists, who are “more appropriately covered by
other provisions of the Constitution.”137 There is no need to redefine
religion to protect speech, association, due process, and equal protec-
tion rights of nonbelievers.
Fourth, rejecting a narrow definition of religion can lead to in-
consistent results and a dual definition of religion under the First
Amendment.138 Some scholars who have embraced a broad definition
of religion have then argued for an inconsistent application of the
Religion Clauses to avoid the unintended consequences of that
definition.139
In sum, sufficient grounds exist to provide the affirmative protec-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause only to believers and not nonbe-
lievers. But even if atheism were treated as a religion—as the next part
of this Article will assume—the demand for atheist chaplains would
require more evaluation.
religious groups to marginalization and persecution” as another reason to treat religion
differently).
135. Laycock, supra note 61, at 317.
136. There is a counter to this point. Professor Tebbe has argued that nontheists are
also a minority group that suffers from discrimination. See Tebbe, supra note 4, at 1124. He
claims they are “despised” by Americans, who view “[s]ome degree of ‘spirituality’” as “a
natural part of human life.” Id. But there is little evidence today to fear state persecution of
nonbelievers on religious grounds. To the contrary, based on decades of Supreme Court
precedent and the continued government retreat from religion, it appears momentum is
in the nontheist’s favor.
137. Pen˜alver, supra note 60, at 802.
138. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
139. See Tebbe, supra note 4, at 1149 (“Although it is possible to imagine strong exemp-
tion claims, courts may approach some of them with a degree of skepticism not appropri-
ate for recognized religions. . . . [R]ules protecting the autonomy of religious institutions
should not extend to organizations of atheists, agnostics, or humanists.”).
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III. Accommodating Atheism: The End of a Faith-Based
Military Chaplaincy?
Despite arguing to the contrary earlier, this part of the Article will
assume arguendo that atheism would qualify as a religion. That as-
sumption does not resolve the ultimate issue of whether atheist mili-
tary chaplains should be accommodated under the Free Exercise
clause. Nontheists demand a specific remedy to accommodate their
religion: the accession of atheist chaplains and the end of an exclu-
sively faith-based chaplaincy. A more searching inquiry must be made
into this demand. Due to their small number of adherents present in
the military, not every variety of faith-based religion in the world has
representation in the chaplaincy.140 Moreover, nonbelief itself
presents unique issues that may preclude an accommodation that fun-
damentally changes a chaplain corps built on the needs of those who
believe in a higher reality.
A. Are Nontheists Deprived of Confidential Communications?
Nontheists contend they are deprived of equal counseling due to
the inadequacy of confidentiality rules governing communications
with therapists and counselors outside the chaplaincy.141 They argue
this creates an unfair situation for secularists, who have no atheist
chaplains to turn to for confidential advice about existential ques-
tions. This policy argument misses the mark of the Free Exercise
Clause because it is not grounded in atheist religious practice and be-
cause confidentiality outside the chaplaincy is sufficient.
Theists and nontheists have equal counseling avenues outside the
chaplain corps where they can speak candidly with trained family ad-
vocacy counselors and mental health professionals in a nonreligious
environment about their private struggles and problems, whether re-
lated to marriage, parenting, substance abuse, war, or personal mental
health. In addition, the military provides its members free confiden-
tial civilian care with off-base counselors through the DOD’s Military
140. Chaplains from unrepresented faiths are authorized “when the military services
‘recognize the need based on their lay constituencies.’ Thus, the armed forces will appoint
chaplains from religions or sects not previously represented when the number of adher-
ents to the particular faith reaches a certain critical mass within the services.” Rosen, supra
note 13, at 1165 (citing INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, EVALUATION REPORT ON
THE DOD CHAPLAIN PROGRAM 12-13 (2004); AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 6-2a).
141. See Kasperowicz, supra note 48 (noting Rep. Jared Polis’s statement that secular
counselors do not “enjoy the same confidentiality that a chaplain visit does”).
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OneSource initiative.142 These communication channels are all cov-
ered by a solid therapist-patient privilege of confidentiality that was
created for purely nonreligious reasons.143
Nontheists complain that this therapist privilege is not all encom-
passing. They are correct; the privilege is less comprehensive than that
found within the chaplain corps. For instance, it does not apply in
cases when the patient is a danger to himself or others or when disclo-
sure is necessary to ensure the safety and security of military property
or classified information.144 But the problem with this nontheist com-
plaint, from a Free Exercise standpoint, is that it does not provide a
religion-based rationale for rejecting these various exceptions. The ar-
eas where confidentiality is not guaranteed have nothing to do with
religious or existential issues, and nontheists have no religion-based
justification to argue for more confidentiality in these areas. Also, the
exceptions apply equally to believing and nonbelieving ser-
vicemembers who seek these counseling services.
But what of the confidentiality available inside the chaplaincy?
Servicemembers of all faiths or no faith also have equal rights to speak
confidentially with a chaplain about any matter.145 Indeed, the mili-
tary privilege extends this confidentiality to all communications to a
chaplain made “as a matter of conscience.”146 Of course, secularists
question whether theist chaplains are capable of providing advice to
142. DEP’T OF DEF. TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, AN ACHIEVABLE VISION: REPORT OF
THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH 13 (2007) [hereinafter AN ACHIEVABLE VI-
SION] (“OneSource is a DOD-funded initiative offering 24-hour, 7-day-a-week, confidential
non-medical information and referral system that can be accessed globally through the
telephone, Internet, and e-mail. In addition, it offers confidential family and personal
counseling in local communities . . . . Face-to-face counseling is provided at no cost for up
to six sessions per person per problem per year.”).
143. See MIL. R. EVID. 513(a) (2012) (“A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made between
the patient and a psychotherapist or an assistant to the psychotherapist . . . if such commu-
nication was made for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s
mental or emotional condition.”); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (discussing the
basis in federal common law for the privilege).
144. MIL. R. EVID. 513(d).
145. See AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-2(a) (“The privilege of confidential com-
munication with a Chaplain is a right of every individual . . . .”).
146. MIL. R. EVID. 503(a) (allowing members the privilege “to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergy-
man . . . if such communication is made either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of
conscience”); see also AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-2(a) (“Confidential communica-
tion is any communication given to a Chaplain in trust by an individual, to include enemy
prisoners of war (EPWs), if such communication is made either as a formal act of religion
or as a matter of conscience.”).
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nontheists—a question to be taken up later.147 For now, the key First
Amendment difficulty is that the nontheist complaint about confiden-
tiality lacks a Free Exercise component. Communications to military
chaplains and civilian clergy are protected under military law as a relig-
ious accommodation, just as in many civilian jurisdictions.148 But this
accommodation stems from a millennia-old religious requirement in
the Catholic Church requiring a priest to preserve the inviolate seal of
secrecy when a penitent confessed sins during the Sacrament of Con-
fession.149 Forcing a priest to reveal the sins of a penitent could have
serious repercussions on the soul of the priest and the ability of the
Church to dispense forgiveness.150 No similar religious argument ac-
companies a secularist’s concerns about confidentiality. With no fear
of divine retribution or forgiveness, the atheist may have practical rea-
sons for confidentiality, but no religion-based justifications.
In short, secularists are not burdened in the exercise of any relig-
ious belief due to the therapist-patient privilege. This policy-based
complaint does not trigger a Free Exercise claim.
B. Is Competent Counseling Available to Nontheists Outside the
Chaplaincy?
Confidentiality aside, proponents for atheist chaplains also raise
two objections regarding the adequacy of secular counseling. They
worry about a perceived stigma associated with the mental health pro-
fession,151 and they complain that secular counselors are not
147. See infra Part.III.C.
148. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 52-101, PLANNING AND ORGANIZING
para. 4.1 (2005) [hereinafter AFI 52-101] (“The privilege of total confidentiality in com-
munications with a chaplain is an essential component of the chaplain’s ministry.”). This is
on par with many state privileges. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(1)(b) (West 2014) (“A
communication between a member of the clergy and a person is ‘confidential’ if made
privately for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel and advice from the member of the
clergy in the usual course of his or her practice or discipline . . . .”).
149. See Chad G. Marzen, Protecting Statements in Catholic Tribunal Proceedings Under the
Priest-Penitent Privilege: Cimijotti v. Paulsen Considered, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 291 (2010)
(discussing the history of the priest-penitent privilege and considering various state privi-
leges that require the communication be penitential in nature).
150. Today, the same strict religious requirements of secrecy still govern Roman Catho-
lic priests. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, No. 2490 (2d ed. 1994) (“[I]t is a
crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for
any reason.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. Nontheists Urge House, supra note 46 (“Religious chaplains are ill equipped to han-
dle the problems of nontheistic service members and unfortunately, seeking psychiatric
help can stigmatize a service member for the rest of their career.” (quoting nontheists)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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equipped to discuss existential questions.152 These objections also fall
short of stating a Free Exercise claim.
Some military members do perceive a stigma against those who
seek the advice of counseling professionals—both chaplains and
mental health providers.153 This stems from a military culture that val-
ues “strength, mental toughness, elitism and self-sufficiency,” while
shunning a culture of professional counseling, which is “deficiency-
oriented and values emotional vulnerability.”154 Counseling from
chaplains also clashes with this military culture; however, ser-
vicemembers perceive less stigma with the chaplaincy155 and feel more
comfortable seeking those services, partly due to the chaplaincy’s
stronger privilege of confidentiality.156
Though unfortunate, the stigma issue does not raise a Free Exer-
cise claim. Both believing and nonbelieving military members are sus-
ceptible to the same fear of a stigma, and it impacts the services of
both chaplains and secular counselors. Moreover, this is mostly a
problem of perception; there are no actual governmental barriers or
burdens to receiving secular counseling services. In fact, the DOD has
152. See House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Robert E. Andrews
(D., NJ)).
153. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS
OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE: STRENGTHENING THE FORCE,
PREVENTING SUICIDE AND SAVING LIVES 59 (2010) [hereinafter PREVENTING SUICIDE AND SAV-
ING LIVES], available at https://ia801008.us.archive.org/0/items/551723-suicide-preven
tion-task-force-final-report/551723-suicide-prevention-task-force-final-report.pdf (“Site vis-
its revealed widespread reports in some military branches and specialties of discriminatory
treatment of Service Members who had made appointments to see mental health profes-
sionals or chaplains for assistance with personal, psychological, emotional, or spiritual con-
cerns and reported being singled out and publicly humiliated, often in front of their entire
units.”).
154. Craig J. Bryan, It’s Okay to Change: Mental Health Stigma, Mental Health Care and
Suicide Prevention Among Military Personnel and Veterans, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-craig-j-bryan/its-okay-to-change-mental_b_3839146
.html.
155. A 2012 study conducted by the DOD and Veterans Administration determined
that “qualitative findings indicate that chaplains may be more likely to be sought out for
care than mental health care providers for reasons such as reduced stigma, greater confi-
dentiality, more flexible availability, and comfort with clergy as natural supports within a
community.” Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and Mental Health in the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY, no. 1, 2013, at 11.
A similar result was noted by a 2010 DOD study into suicide. See PREVENTING SUICIDE AND
SAVING LIVES, supra note 153, at 62.
156. Nieuwsma et al., supra note 155, at 11 (listing confidentiality as a common reason
for preferring a chaplain to a mental health professional); PREVENTING SUICIDE AND SAVING
LIVES, supra note 153, at 63 (“Rather than entering a behavioral healthcare clinic, many
expressed their preference for the chaplaincy because of the added confidentiality and/or
the more acceptable primary care setting.”).
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identified this stigma issue and is actively and systematically engaged
in changing these perceptions and encouraging members to seek
counseling from the many channels available to them, both secular
and religious.157
Nontheists also question whether therapists and counselors are
“equipped to answer those kinds of existential questions” asked by
atheist servicemembers.158 This concern assumes therapists cannot ad-
dress existential questions from a secular perspective and undervalues
the services available from counselors who routinely help clients grap-
ple with difficult personal, family, and mental issues without involving
God. Once the supernatural is removed from the equation, even exis-
tential questions must necessarily find their answer in biological,
chemical, and psychological processes. These are cornerstones of the
modern counseling industry.
Perhaps the real concern here is that, even if therapists do have
the training to handle these issues, nontheists should not be forced to
seek answers from the mental health profession:
It is wrong to say to a soldier who comes from such a [human-
ist] tradition, that he or she, if they have an issue on which they’re
troubled, must go to a mental health professional in order to re-
ceive counseling, rather than someone who comes from their phil-
osophical faith or tradition.159
This concern is valid. The desire to discuss existential questions
in a confidential setting is quite different than seeking professional
services for dysfunctional families or mental illness. But must atheist
chaplains be admitted to address this concern? This leads to the next
critique by nontheists: the adequacy of theist chaplains to handle
nontheist counseling.
C. Can Theist Chaplains Adequately Minister to Nontheists?
In reality, when secularists complain about a lack of confidential-
ity or training outside the chaplaincy, they are mostly complaining
about the lack of atheists inside the chaplaincy. The real issue is
157. See Exec. Order No. 13625, sec. 4(C)(ii)(2), 77 Fed. Reg. 54783 (Sept. 5, 2012)
(setting out as a function of the task force the duty to evaluate “agency efforts to improve
awareness and reduce stigma for those needing to seek care”); AN ACHIEVABLE VISION,
supra note 142, at 15 (setting, as a major priority, the reduction of the stigma associated
with mental health professionals and chaplains).
158. During the 2014 House debate, Rep. Jared Polis argued: “A psychiatrist or a medi-
cal professional is not equipped to answer those kinds of existential questions that a mem-
ber of the military might seek out to discuss with a chaplain. Why am I here? What’s the
meaning of life? How do I justify the use of force?” House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942.
159. Id. (comments of Rep. Robert E. Andrews (D., NJ)).
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whether theist chaplains can adequately serve the “religious” needs of
nontheists. If theist chaplains are up to the task, then the admission of
atheist chaplains under the Free Exercise Clause is not required. But
nontheists maintain that “[r]eligious chaplains are ill equipped to
handle the problems of nontheistic service members.”160 This claim
overlooks both the ability and commitment of theist chaplains to per-
form their duty.
Secularists argue that theist chaplains are untrained in nonreli-
gious philosophies by claiming they rarely receive religious-diversity
instruction in their seminaries, including “training in philosophies
such as humanism, atheism and agnosticism (or Buddhism, pantheis-
tic religions or Wiccan, for that matter).”161 But this claim is inaccu-
rate. Most Christian seminaries offer extensive coursework on world
religions and secular philosophies.162 Once in the military, these
chaplains will also receive additional diversity training.163
More significantly, secularists have argued that some chaplains
cannot extricate themselves from their faith-based views to assist athe-
ist servicemembers. Imagine a nontheist who consults a chaplain due
to a lack of meaning in life. Consider this potential response from
atheist author Richard Dawkins: “There is something infantile in the
presumption that somebody else . . . has a responsibility to give your
life meaning and point. . . . The truly adult view, by contrast, is that
our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to
160. Nontheists Urge House, supra note 46 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Edwina Rogers, Executive Director of the Secular Coalition for America).
161. Secular Letter, supra note 9.
162. Guidelines on the formation of Roman Catholic priests in the United States re-
quire extensive coursework in all types of secular and religious philosophy, including “the
study of logic, epistemology, philosophy of nature, metaphysics, natural theology, anthro-
pology, and ethics.” U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PROGRAM OF PRIESTLY FORMA-
TION 59 (5th ed. 2006), available at http://www.usccb.org/upload/program-priestly-
formation-fifth-edition.pdf. This includes the “study of philosophical anthropology” and
the “philosophical study of the human person, his fulfillment in intersubjectivity, his
destiny, his inalienable rights, and his nuptial character as one of the primary elements
which is expressive of human nature and constitutive of society.” Id. at 60 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also 2012–2013 Academic Catalog, FULLER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
available at http://www.fuller.edu/Microsites/Academic_Catalogs/2012_-_2013/
Course_Descriptions_(School_of_Theology)/ (last visited May 31, 2014) (discussing
courses that address world religion, secular humanism, and other secular philosophies).
163. The Army’s basic chaplain officer course includes several phases of training.
Phase Two emphasizes “pastoral ministry in the military environment, communication
skills, pluralism, ethics, Basic Human Interaction, [and] world religions,” while Phase
Three focuses on “integration of military and pastoral skills including collegiality and plu-
ralism.” Chaplain Basic Officer Leadership Course (CHBOLC), U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN CTR. & SCH.
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://dmna.ny.gov/arng/ocs/chbolc_dates.pdf.
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make it.”164 Could a theist chaplain offer such advice? Nontheists
point to instances where theist chaplains have allegedly overstepped
their bounds and proselytized unwilling atheists instead of accepting
them.165 This criticism strikes at the heart of the chaplaincy: the ability
to relate to members of varying faiths in a pluralistic environment
based on tolerance and respect.
The idea that chaplains serve members of all faith traditions has
been woven into the very fabric of the chaplain corps.166 The Navy
chaplaincy currently lists its core competencies as follows: “Chaplains
care for all Service members, including those who claim no religious
faith, facilitate the religious requirements of personnel of all faiths,
provide faith-specific ministries, and advise the command.”167 An Air
Force chaplain described a chaplain’s duty this way:
A chaplain’s ultimate responsibility is to provide for the free
exercise of religion, including those who express a specific religion
and those who express no religion at all.
From my perspective, I am a chaplain to all, a pastor to some.
I am not allowed to pick and choose whom I will serve based
on a service member’s religious affiliation.168
With only a few Buddhist, Muslim, and Hindu chaplains on active
duty, members of those faith groups—and many other minority relig-
ious groups without specific representation—daily receive advice from
chaplains of widely differing beliefs.169 It is a fact of military life.
Indeed, chaplains are asked to walk a fine line between support-
ing religion under the Free Exercise Clause and counseling members
164. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 360 (2006).
165. This was another area in which secularists engaged President-Elect Obama in
2008, complaining that some “chaplains have reportedly tolerated disparaging remarks
about belief systems . . . and allowed commanding officers to deny privileges to nontheists
that are routinely available to religious members.” Secular Letter, supra note 9.
166. See WAR DEP’T, ARMY REGULATION 60-5, CHAPLAINS para. 4(b) (1941) [hereinafter
AR 60-5] (“Chaplains will serve as friends, counselors, and guides, without discrimination,
to all members of the command to which they are assigned, regardless of creed or sect.”).
167. NAVY INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, supra note 13, at para. 5(e)(3); see also AR 165-1, supra
note 13, at para. 1-5(b) (“Army Chaplains represent faith groups within the pluralistic re-
ligious culture in America and demonstrate the values of religious freedom of conscience
and spiritual choice.”).
168. Keith Beckwith, Military Chaplains Responsibility Is Free Exercise of Religion, NORTH-
FIELD NEWS (May 25, 2013), available at http://www.southernminn.com/northfield_news/
opinion/guest_columns/article_f733dbf5-0ab4-5c17-9994-713806f0c46b.html (editorial by
Air National Guard chaplain).
169. During the 2013 House debate, one Congressman noted: “Military chaplains have
a duty to faithfully serve all servicemembers and to facilitate the free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment.” House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jim
Bridenstine (R., OK)).
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in a setting free from unwanted proselytization. There undoubtedly
are instances where chaplains have not fulfilled the lofty goals of their
calling, but those are relatively few compared to the hundreds of
thousands of counseling sessions conducted by chaplains each year.
From the beginning of their service, chaplains agree “as a condition of
appointment” that they are “willing to function in the diverse and plu-
ralistic environment of the military, with tolerance for diverse relig-
ious traditions and respect for the rights of individuals to determine
their own religious convictions.”170 Daily military life testifies to the
overall faithfulness of chaplains to this duty, as evidenced by the scant
complaints against them and their continued popularity as a source of
counseling among the troops.
From a Free Exercise perspective, another obstacle undermines
the secularist demand for atheist chaplains as a required accommoda-
tion: the proposed solution would not actually solve the alleged
problems for almost all atheist servicemembers. If a small, representa-
tive number of atheist chaplains was admitted in the chaplain corps—
just as a few Hindu and Buddhist chaplains have been admitted—
from a statistical standpoint that would not change the dynamic of
which nontheists complain. With hundreds of military installations
throughout the world, almost all nontheist servicemembers would still
need to rely on theist chaplains and secular counselors to handle their
personal issues. Few military installations would house an atheist chap-
lain available for this kind of counseling. The reality for ser-
vicemembers of all (or no) faiths is that they must rely on the
professionalism of chaplains and other counselors who often do not
share the same faith tradition. The proposed accommodation would
not alter this fact.
D. Can Atheists Fulfill the Duties of a Military Chaplain?
Secularists have demanded the admission of atheist military chap-
lains to better serve the needs of nonbelieving servicemembers. As-
sume arguendo that, first, atheism is a religion and, second, that the
Free Exercise Clause requires the military to provide nontheist mem-
bers with “someone who comes from their philosophical faith or tradi-
170. NAVY INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, supra note 13, at para. 5(e)(2); see also AR 165-1, supra
note 13, at para. 3-2(b)(2) (“Chaplains will minister to the personnel of their unit and/or
facilitate the free-exercise rights of all personnel, regardless of religious affiliation of either
the Chaplain or the unit member.”).
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tion”171 to whom they can speak about existential questions. These
two assumptions do not yet resolve the atheist chaplain question. Tra-
ditionalists have argued that, since 1775, “chaplains have been affili-
ated with faith and spirituality. By definition, chaplains minister to the
spiritual needs of our men and women in the armed services—a vital
function that an individual without any inclination towards spirituality
would not be able to perform.”172 If atheists are unable to fully per-
form the duties of a chaplain, then a different accommodation could
be in order, such as creating a position separate and outside of the
historically faith-based chaplaincy.
Representative John Fleming (R., LA) argued during the 2014
DOD Appropriations Act debate that “[a] chaplain is a person who
ministers to spiritual needs, but who is assigned to a secular organiza-
tion.”173 Current military regulations support this characterization, di-
viding the duties of modern chaplains into three broad categories.
“The Chaplain Service (1) conducts religious observances, (2) pro-
vides pastoral care, and (3) offers advice to leaders on spiritual, ethi-
cal, moral, morale, and religious accommodation issues.”174 This
Subpart questions whether atheists can accomplish these core duties
without fundamentally changing them.
1. Conducting Religious Observances
As perhaps their most trademark duty, chaplains have always held
weekly religious services for military members according to their va-
ried faith-based traditions. This duty has been discussed at length in
even the earliest unofficial chaplain manuals.175 Indeed, it has been
required by federal statute since 1864.176 In the U.S. military today,
171. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Robert E. Andrews (D.,
NJ)).
172. Id. at H4942 (comments of Rep. John Fleming (R., LA)).
173. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943 (comments of Rep. John Fleming (R., LA)).
174. AFPD 52-1, supra note 1, at para. 1.2 (defining “core processes”). The Navy and
Army divide these areas up slightly differently, yet capture the same general idea. See NAVY
INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, supra note 13, at para. 5(e)(3); AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3-
1(b).
175. Robert Nay, The Operational, Social, and Religious Influences Upon the Army
Chaplain Field Manual, 1926-1952 (June 13, 2008) (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College). Prior to the twentieth century, there were no official chaplain
manuals. Id. There were, however, several officially sanctioned works by private Army chap-
lains that set forth the duties of military chaplains. Id. While these manuals do not carry the
full weight of official government pronouncements, they accurately portray the realities of
chaplain life during the nineteenth century. See id.
176. Act of April 9, 1864, ch. 53, sec. 4, 13 Stat. 46 (“[A]ll chaplains in the military
service of the United States shall hold appropriate religious services at the burial of soldiers
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this notion still evokes images of Catholic priests saying Mass, Protes-
tant ministers preaching sermons, Jewish rabbis reading from the To-
rah in the synagogue, and Muslim imams bowing in submissive prayer
to Allah. Even Buddhism—often cited by atheists as an example of a
nontheistic religion177—has military chaplains who offer faith-based
services to servicemembers.178
The legal duty to hold weekly religious services again raises the
question of how to define the term religion—whether it should include
atheism in its embrace.179 But that very modern question would have
been foreign to those who levied the legal requirements for the chap-
laincy. Indeed, when originally passed in 1864 and recodified in 1956,
the statutory requirement for chaplains to hold weekly religious ser-
vices was directed exclusively at faith-based services, not a purely secu-
lar gathering.180 That is still true in the law today, with the Air Force
calling chaplains “visible reminders of the Holy,”181 and the Army re-
quiring that “[a]ll Chaplains provide for the nurture and practice of
religious beliefs, traditions, and customs in a pluralistic environment
to strengthen the spiritual lives of Soldiers and their Families.”182
Secularists maintain that atheist chaplains would fulfill this legal
duty by holding their own weekly services for nontheists—something
that occurs in the few nations with humanist chaplains. Consider a
who may die in the command to which they are assigned to duty, and it shall be their duty
to hold public religious services at least once each Sabbath when practicable.”).
177. This may not be an accurate characterization. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 188-93 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing how Buddhists could be seen to
believe in God, depending on how the term is defined).
178. In 2013, an Army Buddhist chaplain opened a “faith-based resiliency center” at
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan where he “has been leading meditation classes and provid-
ing spiritual support for Army Buddhists” in a “building dedicated to Eastern health and
spiritual practices,” equipped with “a Buddhist altar and statues inside.” Samantha Bryson,
Spiritual Warfare: Buddhist Chaplain Helps Heal Soldiers’ Minds, STARS & STRIPES (May 18,
2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/us/spiritual-warfare-buddhist-chaplain-helps-heal-
soldiers-minds-1.221388 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing Captain Thomas
Dyer, a Baptist minister turned Buddhist chaplain).
179. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion on whether atheism should be treated as a
religion.
180. Not only did chaplains primarily perform religious services, they were strictly lim-
ited in the performance of secular duties. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 165-15,
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES: FUNCTIONS OF CHAPLAINS, COMMANDERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RE-
PORTS para. 2(a) (1955) (“The status of a chaplain in the Army is that of a religious and
spiritual leader. . . . He may be detailed to perform secular duties only in cases of extreme
military emergency.”).
181. AFI 52-101, supra note 148, at para. 2.1.
182. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3-2(a). This is consistent with traditional require-
ments that chaplains “strive to promote morality, religion, and good order” in their units.
AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 4(b).
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description by a Dutch atheist chaplain—actually, a “humanist coun-
selor,” a term specially designed to avoid the word chaplain183—who
deployed from the Netherlands to Afghanistan.184 She explained that
in her ministry she gives soldiers talks on different topics, such as for-
giveness, and speaks with them about “learning to let go, about the
families that the soldiers have left at home and how to deal with being
part of a war.”185 Other issues atheist chaplains might discuss with
members as part of their ministry include existential questions such
as: “Why am I here? What’s the meaning of life? How do I justify the
use of force?”186
One can hardly dispute that nontheist servicemembers will grap-
ple with these types of existential questions—universal, ultimate
human questions to which religion has provided answers throughout
history. Nor should one doubt that the atheist’s answers to these ques-
tions will be uniquely different from that of the Christian, Muslim, or
Jew. Recall atheist author Richard Dawkins’s quip that “[t]here is
something infantile in the presumption that somebody else . . . has a
responsibility to give your life meaning and point.”187 As one
nontheist argued, a humanist community “mostly does what religions
do—provide fellowship and a chance for ethical and moral develop-
ment. ‘If there’s a reason to support religion in the military, it’s the
ethics and values that come out of it, not the supernatural
claims . . . .’”188 Imagine nontheist servicemembers coming together
in fellowship with one another, raising their voices in song about the
brotherhood and sisterhood of humankind, followed by the type of
sermon described by the Dutch counselor about forgiveness and war
or a talk on the meaning of life.
At least in appearance, that kind of secular gathering would not
be far different from the weekly services held in some traditional
Western religions. But it would still lack any faith-based component
183. See Jason Torpy, Humanist Chaplains in the Dutch Military, MILITARY ASS’N OF ATHE-
ISTS & FREETHINKERS (Mar. 29, 2013), http://militaryatheists.org/news/2013/03/human
ist-chaplains-in-the-dutch-military/ (noting that humanists were not designated with the
name chaplain).
184. Matthew Fisher, Padre Offers Guidance Without God, EDMONTON J. (May 1, 2009),
http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=33973229-2683-46ec-ae
1a-c215207206ab&p=1) (interviewing a female humanist chaplain stationed in Afghanistan
in 2009).
185. Id.
186. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D., CO)).
187. Dawkins, supra note 164, at 360.
188. Carroll, supra note 10 (quoting Army Captain Ryan Jean, organizer of ATOM).
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directed to the Holy189 or the spiritual.190 And that is the critical ob-
jection raised by traditionalists. Once atheist chaplains are admitted,
the definition of a religious service will need modification to focus it
away from the Holy and on to some broader concept that would en-
compass both the spiritual and the nonspiritual. This would necessa-
rily result in a fundamental redefinition of the chaplain’s most sacred
duty, as is discussed further in Part IV.
The issue becomes even more complicated when removed from
the weekly service to the other types of services chaplains must be
ready to perform, such as funerals and memorials.191 Could an atheist
chaplain perform these for a theist military member? Current Army
regulations allow for chaplains to opt out of performing services that
“would be in variance with the tenets or practices of their faith.”192 For
the vast majority of religious military members who die, a religious
service would be expected and desired. Atheist chaplains would likely
need to opt out of those services to remain true to their own beliefs.193
In sum, traditionalists would argue that an atheist chaplain can-
not perform the religious observances envisioned by current federal
law and military regulation. Moreover, even if one were to assume that
a weekly secular service would satisfy the requirement for a religious
observance, it is likely that atheist chaplains would opt out of services
for the majority of members, who still overwhelmingly subscribe to a
faith-based religious tradition.
189. See supra text accompanying note 181.
190. See supra text accompanying note 182.
191. This is another area where chaplains have long performed important duties. See
AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 4(b)–(c) (requiring chaplains to conduct “appropriate
religious services,” “activities as usually attach to formal or informal Sunday or weekday
religious observances,” “burial services,” the “marriage rite,” and “Christian baptism”); 10
U.S.C. § 3547(a) (2012) (requiring chaplains to perform “religious burial services for
members of the Army who die while in [their] command.”).
192. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3-2(b)(6); see also NAVY INSTRUCTION 1730.7D,
supra note 13, at para. 6(e) (“When invited to deliver religious elements at command func-
tions, if the chaplain chooses not to participate, he or she may do so without adverse
consequences.”).
193. It would seem to be asking too much for an atheist chaplain to fake it with regard
to a service where one talks about the joys of an afterlife awaiting the deceased ser-
vicemember. In contrast, a theist chaplain performing a memorial service for a nontheist
could honor the memory of the member without making outward references to God, if
that were the best way to comply with that member’s wishes.
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2. Providing Pastoral Care
The second broad category of chaplain duties is to provide pas-
toral care to servicemembers and their families.194 This wide-ranging
mission occurs both on and off the battlefield, at home and abroad. It
requires chaplains to put themselves in harm’s way as they comfort
wounded soldiers in combat zones and to put themselves in uncom-
fortable situations at military hospitals as they console grieving family
members or those diagnosed with illness. Some wonder whether athe-
ists are equipped to provide the counseling expected from chaplains
during those difficult times when people often seek spiritual answers
or turn to God for help.195
Seven U.S. military chaplains have been awarded the Medal of
Honor196 and several others have been killed or wounded and re-
ceived medals such as the Four Chaplains’ Award197 and the Purple
Heart.198 Consider the service of two chaplains posthumously awarded
the Medal of Honor. Father Vincent Capodanno—a Navy chaplain
killed in Vietnam attempting to rescue a wounded medical corps-
194. AFPD 52-1, supra note 1, at para. 1.2.
195. For instance, during the 2013 House Debate, Representative John Fleming openly
doubted the ability of atheist chaplains “to minister to the spiritual needs” of believers.
House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943.
196. See DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 42; Kapaun to Be 7th Chaplain to Earn Medal
of Honor, WICHITA EAGLE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.kansas.com/2013/04/10/2755994/
kapaun-to-be-7th-chaplain-to-earn.html. The other awardees were two chaplains from the
Civil War, one from World War II, and three from Vietnam. Id.
197. This 1961 “Special Medal for Heroism” was awarded posthumously to four chap-
lains for their acts aboard the USAT Dorchester, sunk by a German U-boat in 1943. The Saga
of the Four Chaplains, FOUR CHAPLAINS MEM’L FOUND., http://www.fourchaplains.org/
story.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). The chaplains encouraged the men and gave up
their places on a lifeboat. Id.
Rabbi Goode did not call out for a Jew; Father Washington did not call out for a
Catholic; nor did the Reverends Fox and Poling call out for a Protestant. They
simply gave their life jackets to the next man in line.
As the ship went down, survivors in nearby rafts could see the four chap-
lains—arms linked and braced against the slanting deck. Their voices could also
be heard offering prayers.
Id.
198. For instance, as recently as February 2014, Chaplain Captain Michael Frese re-
ceived the Purple Heart for injuries he received during a hostile rocket attack in Afghani-
stan in 2011. See Indiana Air Guard Chaplain Receives Purple Heart, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb.
24, 2014), http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140224/NEWS/302240015/Indiana-Air-
Guard-chaplain-receives-Purple-Heart.
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man199—received this recommendation for a Bronze Star while still
alive:
Father Capodanno was particularly adept in putting men in the
proper frame of mind before and during battle. . . . He eliminated
bitterness from their hearts and instilled Christian determination
and morals to be drawn against in future battles. He encouraged
the men of all faiths to do more for their God, our Country, their
corps and themselves.200
The citation to accompany Father Capodanno’s Medal of Honor
recounted his death as he “moved about the battlefield administering
last rites to the dying and giving medical aid to the wounded . . . [and]
provided encouragement by voice and example to the valiant
marines.”201
Army chaplain Father Emil Kapaun displayed similar courage
before he died in a prisoner-of-war camp during the Korean War.202
He pulled several soldiers to safety during battle and, while a prisoner,
kept up the men’s spirits by sneaking “past guards to visit the enlisted
huts, sharing news and encouragement and saying a brief prayer dur-
ing each visit.”203 On Easter Sunday, he celebrated a prohibited
ecumenical sunrise service in the ruins of a burned out church. . . .
Most of the men in the officers’ compound attended, including
Catholics, Protestants, Jews and atheists. . . . The officers sang at
the top of their lungs, hoping the music would reach the other
prisoners at Pyoktong.”204
The courageous deaths of Chaplains Capodanno and Kapaun il-
lustrate the special calling of military chaplains to cater to the Free
Exercise needs of the nation’s brave men and women in their deepest
hours of suffering. On the battlefield, wounded or dying military
members can turn to the comfort of a chaplain to help cope with the
most significant emotional crisis in their lives—an appointment that
cannot be rescheduled for a more convenient time. Although no sta-
tistics are kept on such things, servicemembers who do not profess
belief in a deity sometimes turn to God in those most trying of
199. Medal of Honor Recipients: Vietnam War, U.S. ARMY CTR. OF MILITARY HISTORY, http:/
/www.history.army.mil/moh/vietnam-a-l.html#CAPODANNO (last updated Apr. 14,
2014).
200. ANN BALL, FACES OF HOLINESS II 255 (2001) (quoting Major Edward Fitzgerald’s
recommendation of Father Capodanno for the Bronze Star).
201. Medal of Honor Recipients: Vietnam War, supra note 199.
202. William C. Latham Jr., Father Emil Kapaun, 2012 ARMY MAGAZINE 38, 41–43, availa-
ble at http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2012/11/Documents/
Latham_1112.pdf.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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times.205 Traditionalists worry that an atheist chaplain would be una-
ble to fulfill this duty: “[A]n atheist chaplain would be the last person
in the world that we would want for a dying soldier who needs that last
moment of counseling in their life.”206
Off the battlefield, the pastoral duties of a chaplain continue at
home, where chaplains individually counsel servicemembers and work
in programs that build up military families.207 Their work includes
“coaching on military life, pre- and post-deployment training for Ser-
vice members and their families, [and] crisis prevention and re-
sponse.”208 They also provide support in various well-being programs,
including “suicide prevention, domestic violence and intervention,
sexual assault prevention and response, deployment cycle support,
and battle mind training.”209 Notably, they are part of the military
team that must inform next-of-kin about the death of their military
family member.210 Nontheists argue these duties do not require a be-
lief in God for a chaplain to accomplish them; they are mistaken. The
role of chaplain as pastoral counselor has always been a religious duty
because “pastoral counseling is a formal and spiritually integrated pro-
cess enabling Army constituents to change, cope, and resolve their
presenting issues in a religious framework.”211 It does not seem possi-
ble for atheists to fulfill some of these roles without changing the na-
ture of pastoral counseling by removing the spiritual from this
religious framework.
How do nontheists address these concerns? They point out that
nonbelieving military members have needs that are similar in kind to
the spiritual needs of believers but require the expertise of one
trained in humanistic philosophy.212 They also contend that atheist
205. This notion explains the aphorism, “[t]here are no atheists in foxholes,” often
attributed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Alex Murashko, Air Force Republishes Chap-
lain’s ‘No Atheists in Foxholes’ Article to Base Website, CHRISTIAN POST (Aug. 14, 2013), http://
www.christianpost.com/news/air-force-republishes-chaplains-no-atheists-in-foxholes-arti
cle-to-base-website-102226/.
206. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943 (comments of Rep. John Fleming (R., LA)).
207. See AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-1 (“Pastoral care and counseling describes
a broad range of activities involved in caring for and strengthening Army personnel to
survive and grow through the multitude of experiences that are part of military life.”).
208. NAVY INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, supra note 13, at para. 5(e)(3)(a).
209. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-3(f).
210. AFI 52-101, supra note 148, at para. 4.2 (“Chaplains are members of the notifica-
tion team. They provide pastoral care and support for both next-of-kin and death notifica-
tion team members.”).
211. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-3(a)(3).
212. See Dao, supra note 11 (“Humanism fills the same role for atheists that Christianity
does for Christians and Judaism does for Jews . . . . It answers questions of ultimate con-
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chaplains could be trained to work with believing servicemembers in
the same way that Buddhists and Hindus can work with monotheistic
members.213 One atheist chaplain candidate has explained how he
would handle a military member seeking him out to pray:
As a pastoral caregiver, I wouldn’t lead a prayer with that par-
ticular person, but I would help them with it. . . . Having come
from the background of Christians, I would understand what sort
of things to help the person speak about. . . . [I]t would be on the
sort of terms where I would be able to work more with them
philosophically.214
Even if workable in theory, this approach might not fulfill the
practical Free Exercise needs of that servicemember at the moment. It
is also notable that this candidate’s ability to reach out to religious
military members is grounded in his former life as a Christian—a situ-
ation that will not be the case with all atheist chaplains.
In sum, it is doubtful an atheist could perform the traditionally
spiritual duties of pastoral counseling that separate a chaplain’s heal-
ing from that of a mental health professional.
3. Offering Advice to Leaders
Chaplains serve a “dual role as religious leaders and religious sup-
port staff officers.”215 The final area of their duties puts them squarely
into the role of staff officers. Specifically, this third category requires
chaplains to offer “advice to leaders on spiritual, ethical, moral, mo-
rale, and religious accommodation issues.”216 Although more modern
in its heritage, this has been another longstanding function of the
chaplain corps.217 Significantly, of the three duty areas this one seems
most suitable to chaplains of all faiths or no faith.
cern; it directs our values.” (quoting Jason Torpy, head of the MAAF) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
213. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942-H4943 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D.,
CO)) (“[J]ust as Catholics have to handle the needs of Jews and Muslims in the service and
Buddhist chaplains handle the needs of others, they’re all trained to handle the needs of
soldiers.”).
214. Burnett, supra note 55 (quoting Jason Heap, an applicant to become one of the
first atheist chaplains).
215. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3-1(b).
216. AFPD 52-1, supra note 1, at para. 1.2; see also AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3-
3(b)(1)(f); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[The modern military
chaplain] serves as a liaison between the soldiers and their commanders, advising the latter
of racial unrest, drug or alcohol abuse, and other problems affecting the morale and effi-
ciency of the unit, and helps to find solutions.”).
217. For instance, during World War II, regulations required the Army Chief of Chap-
lains to make recommendations to military commanders “for such action as he deems
advisable to promote the moral and spiritual welfare and contentment of the Army.” AR
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Chaplains advise commanders on the “religious needs of assigned
personnel;” the “spiritual, ethical, and moral health of the command;”
the “personal impact of command policies, leadership practices, and
management systems;” the “[e]thical, moral, and humanitarian impli-
cations of operational decisions;” and the “impacts of indigenous reli-
gions on military operations.”218 No doubt, someone with a faith-
based perspective would be invaluable in taking the spiritual pulse of
the overwhelming majority of members in the command who share a
spiritual belief system. Still, an intuitive and personable atheist chap-
lain would also be able to provide competent advice to military com-
manders on these matters. Similarly, an atheist chaplain familiar with
the legal guidance surrounding the chaplaincy could accurately advise
commanders about “public prayer, memorials, prayer at official func-
tions and meetings, visits by ecclesiastical endorsing agencies, and re-
lations with civilian religious leaders and communities.”219
The role of chaplains as advisors traditionally assumed they
brought a special faith-based value to commanders in these areas. For
that reason, some might still argue that there are aspects of this advis-
ing role that seem better suited to a chaplain of faith. For instance,
the Air Force requires chaplains to provide “[a]dvice consistent with
their role as visible reminders of the Holy.”220 This is clearly a faith-
based role. Yet the core of the advising duty is different in kind from
the chaplain’s role in conducting religious observances or providing
pastoral counseling. The advice function occurs primarily in the chap-
lain’s role as a support staff officer, the equivalent of a commander’s
legal advisor or personnel advisor. For that reason, advice to com-
manders takes place in a more spiritually sterile environment than the
other two functions—an environment suitable to a nonbelieving
chaplain.
In conclusion, atheist chaplains would be ill-suited to fulfill two
out of three key roles of a modern military chaplain—at least not with-
out redefining the spiritual core of those functions.
60-5, supra note 166, at para. 2(a)(1)(b). Chaplains were advisors to “the commander and
staff in religious and moral activities of the command,” id. at para. 4(i)(1), as well as super-
visors “of the spiritual welfare of the command,” id. at para. 4(i)(2), and the “logical con-
sultant in all matters pertaining to public religious observances in the command and in
matters involving morale, morality, and character building,” id. at para. 5.
218. AR 165-1, supra note 13, para. 3-3(f).
219. AFI 52-101, supra note 148, at para. 5.4.
220. Id. at para. 5.1.
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4. The Secular Duties of a Chaplain
Before moving to the final part of the Article, it is necessary to
address one other issue. Nontheists sometimes argue that the chap-
laincy has become more secularized over time and that the presence
of these nonreligious duties supports the admission of atheist chap-
lains.221 This position overstates the reality and ignores changes over
history.
It is true that, at various times in history, chaplains took on addi-
tional duties that did not require belief in God. In the 1800s, it was
common for chaplains, especially in military forts, to hold other jobs
on post, such as schoolmaster and librarian.222 In the Navy, “[u]ntil
the Government established the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1845,
the main burden of preparing junior officiers [sic] for their future
duties rested upon chaplains.”223 According to Army Regulations in
1913, chaplains also provided “instruction of the enlisted men in the
common English branches of education,”224 tracked “births, baptisms,
marriages and deaths” in the command,225 and did other duties, such
as taking “charge of the recreations and amusements of enlisted
men,” encouraging “correspondence between soldiers and their rela-
tives and friends,” and answering the mail on behalf of certain military
members.226 None of this required religious training.
The use of chaplains in this manner began to change when mili-
tary leadership recognized these additional secular duties presented a
threat to the ability of chaplains to perform their core religious func-
tions. By World War II, the duties of chaplains were regulated so com-
manders could not misuse chaplains by tasking them with a host of
secular duties. In the words of one 1941 Army regulation: “Chaplains
will not be employed on any duties other than those required of them
by law, or pertaining to their profession as clergymen, except when
221. See Carroll, supra note 10 (interviewing Jason Torpy, head of the MAAF).
222. See NORTON, supra note 26, at 56.
223. 1 CLIFFORD M. DRURY, THE HISTORY OF THE CHAPLAIN CORPS, UNITED STATES NAVY,
1778-1939, at 30 (1950).
224. U.S. WAR DEP’T, REGULATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, Article VII,
para. 44, at 17 (1913) [hereinafter REGULATIONS FOR THE ARMY].
225. Id. at para. 45, at 17.
226. Id. at para. 461/2(1), (3), (4), at 18. Some of these duties were reaffirmed in 1937
and 1941, particularly the chaplain’s role in encouraging correspondence and teaching
enlisted men (but only in “regiments of colored troops”). See AR 60-5, supra note 166, at
para. 4(d)–(f).
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there exists an exigency of the service.”227 This prohibition continues
today in modified form, with Army commanders being prohibited by
regulation from assigning chaplains to many nonreligious duties 228
unless in a “temporary military emergency” the chaplain volunteers to
“participate or cooperate in nonreligious noncombatant functions
that contribute to the welfare of the command.”229
Nontheist arguments about the secular duties of a chaplain raise
a valid point—as far as they go. Atheists would be able to perform the
nonreligious duties given to chaplains in the military today. But, as
demonstrated earlier, those limited secular duties do not capture the
spiritual essence of the military chaplaincy.230 For that reason, if any
nontheist accommodation is required at all, it should be provided
outside the bounds of the traditional chaplain corps.
IV. The Redefining Impact of Atheists on the Chaplain
Corps
Part II of this Article questioned whether nontheists could use
the affirmative protection of the Free Exercise Clause to demand the
religious accommodation of atheist military chaplains. Part III con-
cluded that the objections to an exclusively faith-based chaplaincy did
not raise viable Free Exercise claims, and that the requested accom-
modation was unreasonable because atheists would be unable to per-
227. See AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 4(g) (additionally, specifically forbidding
chaplains from “detail as post exchange, athletic, recreation, or morale officers, or as de-
fense counsel in courts martial”).
228. Army chaplains cannot be detailed “as an exchange, athletic, recreation, drug or
alcohol, suicide prevention program manager, graves registration, welfare, morale, unit
victim advocate (UVA), sexual assault response coordinator (SARC), dining facility, per-
sonal affairs, information, education, human relations, equal opportunity, next of kin noti-
fication, prisoner escort, safety, survivor assistance, or civil affairs officer.” AR 165-1, supra
note 13, at para. 3–4. Nor can they be assigned “as military judge, trial counsel, defense
counsel, financial liability investigating officer, investigating officer, or member, or adviser
to investigative boards of officers.” Id.; see also NAVY INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, supra note 13, at
para. 6(f)–(h) (prohibiting Navy commanders from assigning a chaplain a duty as a com-
batant during war; as “director, solicitor, or treasurer of funds;” or “as an investigating
officer;” or to “stand watch[ ]” or engage in “collateral duties” that violate the chaplain’s
religious practices or compromise the confidentiality of the office).
229. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 3–4.
230. Chaplains were always seen this way. For instance, an Army regulation from 1937
described the duties of a chaplain as:
closely analogous to those performed by clergymen in civilian life, modified only
by the peculiar conditions attaching to military life and especially by the necessity
that each chaplain will, so far as practicable, serve the moral and religious needs
of the entire personnel of the command to which he is assigned.
AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 4(a).
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form all the duties required of chaplains. This final Part argues that
admission of atheists could fundamentally redefine the mission of the
chaplain corps and negatively impact the rights of believing military
members who—unlike nontheist servicemembers—have nowhere else
to turn in the military to meet their Free Exercise needs.
When evaluating the demand for atheist chaplains, the requested
accommodation must be viewed through the lens of history.
[The Supreme Court] has long recognized that the military is,
by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. . . .
[It] has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own
during its long history. The differences between the military and
civilian communities result from the fact that “it is the primary bus-
iness of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should
the occasion arise.”231
This final part of the Article argues that a faith-based chaplaincy al-
ways has been viewed as a necessary part of military life and that
changing its exclusively faith-based focus could negatively impact the
very military members whose spiritual needs justify its existence under
the Free Exercise Clause. It concludes that any attempt to bring athe-
ist counselors into the military should be accomplished without dis-
turbing the exclusively faith-based nature of the chaplain corps.
A. The Historically Faith-Based Identity of the Chaplain Corps
The military chaplaincy is now, and always has been, a faith-based
religious organization. The term chaplain was formed in the Middle
Ages and stemmed from cappellanus, the Latin word for “clergy-
man”232 or “custodial priest.”233 The name referred to the miraculous
cloak (capella) of Saint Martin of Tours, the fourth-century patron
saint of France, a supposed fragment of which was often carried into
battle by French rulers.234 The cappellanus, which became chapellain in
231. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (citing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)
(“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society.”).
232. See Clergyman Definition, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://etymonline.com/
?search=clergyman (last visited May 22, 2014).
233. DRAZIN & CURREY supra note 23, at 4.
234. Id. Tradition stemming from as early as the ninth century posits that St. Martin
(ca. 316-397) shared his cape with a beggar who, in a dream, was revealed to be Jesus
Christ. Id.; Michael McCormick, The Liturgy of War from Antiquity to the Crusades, in THE
SWORD OF THE LORD: MILITARY CHAPLAINS FROM THE FIRST TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
45, 45-46 (Doris L. Bergen ed., 2004) [hereinafter THE SWORD OF THE LORD].
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Old French and “chaplain” in English, carried the sacred relic.235 The
special sanctuary where the chaplains stored it was called a
“chapel.”236 This religious core of the military chaplaincy has persisted
throughout history237 and across cultures.238
1. The Ancient Religious Origins of the Military Chaplaincy
The practice of military forces employing the services of clergy-
men stretches back to early recorded history.239 A more formalized
military chaplaincy began to take shape in the fourth century;240 how-
ever, a wider need for chaplains arose only after the seventh century
when changes in Church practice allowed soldiers to obtain contin-
ued pardon for their sins through the Sacrament of Confession.241 In
the centuries that followed, the presence of military chaplains in West-
ern armies became common.242 Those chaplain-priests who accompa-
nied military troops “sought to maintain the morale of their fighters”
235. DRAZIN & CURREY supra note 23, at 4.
236. Id.
237. The definition of chaplain, which has not strayed far from its roots, is a clergyman
in charge of a chapel, who is attached to a military branch or other institution. Chaplain
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chaplain (last
visited May 31, 2014).
238. The Spanish, French, Dutch, Swedish, and English all traveled with priests and
pastors on their settlement journeys and military campaigns. See RICHARD M. BUDD, SERV-
ING TWO MASTERS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY CHAPLAINCY, 1860-1920, at 8
(2002).
239. Ministers of religion have accompanied troops into battle for thousands of years,
even in pre-Christian times. For instance, ancient Assyrian “divination experts who tried to
interpret the will of the gods” traveled with armies on military campaigns. AMANDA H.
PODANY & MARNI MCGEE, THE ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN WORLD 134 (2005). Similarly, the
Old Testament reports that the ancient Israelites brought their priests to war to encourage
the troops to be courageous in battle with the knowledge that God was on their side. See
Deuteronomy 20:1-4; Joshua 6:6-7. Finally, in the centuries following the death of Jesus Christ,
pagan priests sometimes traveled with the pre-Christian armies of the Roman Empire. See
Ralph W. Mathison, Emperors, Priests, and Bishops, in THE SWORD OF THE LORD, supra note
234, at 29, 30-32.
240. The historian, Eusebius, reports that Emperor Constantine carried a traveling
chapel, along with clergy, on his military campaigns. Mathison, supra note 239, at 36. By
the middle of the fifth century, the use of ad hoc chaplains is well attested, both in Roman
and Barbarian military units. Id. at 37.
241. Prior to that time, the Church—viewing the art of war as incompatible with Chris-
tianity—had required soldiers to leave military life when they first repented of their sins.
See David S. Bachrach, The Medieval Military Chaplain and His Duties, in THE SWORD OF THE
LORD, supra note 234, at 69, 75.
242. See McCormick, supra note 234, at 51-52. Chaplains became even more common
after the rise of the Carolingian monarchy in the ninth century and the run-up to the First
Crusade at the end of the eleventh century. Id.
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through “pastoral care,” “liturgical services,” and helping the troops
“purify themselves before battle.”243
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Catholic Church for-
malized the role of military chaplains in various canonical docu-
ments.244 In a papal bull in 1238, Pope Gregory defined the duties of
military chaplains as “to hear confessions, assign penances, and carry
out the other sacraments,” as well as to “provide moral encourage-
ment to the men through sermons . . . [and] to make them feel better
about their military service.”245 The Church intended these priests to
serve a purely spiritual function, as evidenced by a “longstanding ca-
nonical prohibition in effect against priests and bishops carrying arms
or fighting.” 246 Chaplains would continue this religious role as an
important feature of military life in the centuries to come.
2. The Colonial Chaplaincy and the American Revolution
Even after the Protestant Reformation, the religious duties of
chaplains remained largely the same, as conquistadors and colonists
explored the New World.247 This continued through the British colo-
nial period, with English colonists adopting the practice of their home
country.248 Chaplains engaged in the major campaigns of the colonial
243. Id. at 54-55. Chaplains played an important morale-building role, See Roy J. Honey-
well, Chaplains of the United States Army 6-8 (1958), because “soldiers fight better when
they are sure that their cause is morally right and when they are sustained by religious
faith.” Id. at 7.
244. See Bachrach, supra note 241, at 70-71. The most notable of these canonical docu-
ments were written by Bishop Ivo of Chartres (1090-1115), Pope Innocent III (1198-1216),
and Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241). Id.
245. Id. at 70.
246. Id. at 71. In fact, the canonical prohibition stemmed from Canon 2 of the Council
of Ratisbon (Regensburg), which prohibited “the servant of God in every way from bearing
arms or fighting in the army or going against the enemy, except those alone who because
of their sacred office, namely, for celebrating of mass and caring for the relics of the saints,
have been designated for this office.” HONEYWELL, supra note 243, at 7. The evidence indi-
cates, however, that many did not adhere to this prohibition against fighting. See id. (“Feu-
dalism brought some departures from this noncombatant rule. When lands were given to
monasteries or other religious foundations, it became necessary for the abbots or bishops
to assume their full responsibilities to their vassals. Often this meant both religious and
military leadership, and numbers of these suzerain-chaplains died with sword or axe in
hand.”); DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that soldier-priests frequently fought
in combat).
247. See BUDD, supra note 238. In fact, the first Christian martyrs in North America were
Spanish missionaries in the 1500s. See 1 PARKER C. THOMPSON, FROM ITS EUROPEAN ANTE-
CEDENTS TO 1791: THE UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY 1–2 (1978) (describing the deaths
of several Catholic missionaries).
248. See BUDD, supra note 238, at 8-9 (noting that the colonial militias organized their
chaplains using the English tactical model—placing one chaplain in each military regi-
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period against the Native Americans,249 including the major event of
King Philip’s War in the 1670s.250 During the French and Indian War,
the colonists extensively relied on chaplain spiritual services, with
George Washington complaining at one point that his unit’s lack of a
chaplain reflected “dishonor upon the regiment.”251 The colonists val-
ued chaplains because of the positive impact their spiritual services
had on the morale of the soldiers during a military campaign.252
At the dawn of the American Revolution, colonial militias ap-
pointed chaplains to their units—some chosen by governors and
others by military commanders.253 Once the war began, the Continen-
tal Congress first encouraged254 and then officially created a military
chaplaincy as a separate branch within the Continental Army.255 The
ment “as the resident professional in spiritual matters”). This can be seen throughout the
colonial period. For instance, in 1690, Massachusetts appointed four chaplains to accom-
pany its military expedition into Quebec against the French. See DRAZIN & CURREY supra
note 23, at 7. Yet not all military chaplains accompanied the men in the field during time
of war. In some instances, chaplains were given peacetime roles at military forts. See id.
(citing an instance in 1702 where Reverend Joseph Smith was assigned by Massachusetts
for three years to Brookfield).
249. In 1637, when colonists in Connecticut drafted an army of only ninety men to
rebuff Native American raids from the Pequot Nation, they appointed a chaplain to serve
the needs of these soldiers. See DRAZIN & CURREY supra note 23, at 6; HONEYWELL, supra note
243, at 11-12.
250. See THOMPSON, supra note 247, at 17-21 (describing chaplain involvement in King
Philip’s War).
251. Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). The true value of chaplains can be
seen in their salaries, which exceeded those of other junior officers. See DRAZIN & CURREY
supra note 23, at 9.
252. See THOMPSON, supra note 247, at 70 (noting how chaplain “care involved visiting
the sick and wounded, and spiritual counseling to anxious souls”). From a practical per-
spective, commanders viewed morality and godliness as essential components of an effec-
tive military force, assisting with discipline and the proper conduct of war. See WILLIAM E.
DICKENS, JR., ANSWERING THE CALL: THE STORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY CHAPLAINCY FROM THE
REVOLUTION THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 7 (1999). As George Washington noted, military
chaplains “improve morale and discourage gambling, swearing, and drunkenness.” Id.
Washington similarly blamed the absence of a chaplain for the sad state of the “the
drunken and demoralized troops he commanded.” DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 23, at 9.
Chaplains made an impact by offering daily prayers and preaching to the men, who were
often required by law to attend such devotions or else face punishment. Id. at 7.
253. DICKENS, supra note 252, at 8.
254. See id. (stating that Congress encouraged “the churches to supply ministers for the
army”).
255. See DICKENS, supra note 252, at 8. After creating the chaplaincy on July 29, 1775,
Congress made various authorizations for chaplains throughout the Revolution, eventually
settling on one chaplain per brigade, with pay equal to that of a colonel. See id. at 9-10. The
creation of a military chaplaincy in the Continental Navy was less explicit. In 1776, the
Continental Navy passed regulations requiring religious services, although it was appar-
ently up to the captain to procure a chaplain for his ship. See id. at 19. The Continental
Congress clearly contemplated the need and use of chaplains, as demonstrated by the Con-
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non-American armies of the Loyalists, Hessians, and French also em-
ployed regimental chaplains.256 During the Revolution, chaplains pri-
marily served the spiritual needs of the soldiers.257 In addition to
preaching, conducting religious services, and attempting to keep the
soldiers as moral as possible, chaplains also tended to the personal
needs of the sick and wounded, helped to prepare them for a good
death if necessary,258 and encouraged them that God was on their
side.259
3. The Birth and Growth of the U.S. Military Chaplaincy
After passage of the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the chaplaincy faced neither resistance nor serious constitutional
doubt, despite its spiritual core.260 In 1791, with the U.S. Army sized at
a mere two regiments, the same Congress that passed the First
Amendment authorized the position of military chaplain to be part of
tinental Congress’s January 1776 mention of chaplains splitting the ship’s “prize money,”
and the November 1776 setting of a Navy chaplain’s pay. See DRURY, supra note 223, at 3-4.
256. BUDD, supra note 247, at 10.
257. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 247 (describing the role of chaplains during
the American Revolution and providing numerous examples of spiritual and pastoral
care). Some chaplains, however, took up arms and fought. See JOEL T. HEADLEY, CHAPLAINS
AND CLERGY OF THE REVOLUTION 121 (1864) (“There was a class of clergymen in the Revolu-
tion who regarded the struggle so sacred that they felt it their duty to fight sometimes as
well as pray.”); HONEYWELL, supra note 243, at 51 (noting “no obligation for chaplains to
refrain from belligerent acts was recognized during the early years of the war,” and that
several chaplains “led militia companies, acting as their chaplains at the same time”).
258. For instance, after the Battle of Concord on April 19, 1775, Chaplain David Mc-
Clure addressed the concerns of a wounded American soldier: “I conversed with him a
short time on the prospect of death, and a preparation for that solemn scene; to which he
appeared to pay serious attention.” DRAZIN & CURREY supra note 23, at 13 (quoting Chap-
lain David McClure).
259. Consider this sermon preached to colonial soldiers on the eve of the Battle of
Brandywine on September 11, 1777, which would be lost by the outnumbered Americans
under Washington’s command: “[R]emember, soldiers, that God is with you. The eternal
God is with you, and fights for you. God! the awful, the infinite, fights for you and you will
triumph.” HEADLEY, supra note 257, at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Some scholars point out that James Madison—influential due to his prime role in
drafting the Constitution and First Amendment—voiced concerns about the military chap-
laincy later in his life. See Andy G. Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 145, 189 (2008) (explaining that Madison’s writings after his presidency reflect a
belief the military chaplaincy was unconstitutional, although a “closer question” than that
of legislative chaplaincies). But while Madison was in office, without protest or caveat, he
nominated several chaplains to the U.S. Senate for confirmation and signed two bills into
law authorizing military chaplains. See id. at 185-86 (justifying Madison’s Presidential action
as “mere formalit[ies]” that do not reveal his true views on the chaplaincy).
446 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
the Army’s small, permanent support staff.261 It was not until the
1850s that anyone seriously questioned the legitimacy of the chap-
laincy, with several groups unsuccessfully petitioning Congress to abol-
ish it.262
For the next century the chaplaincy continued to grow. The tasks
of chaplains remained as they were in the past and included the duty
to conduct “appropriate religious services” on Sundays263—a compul-
sory practice for military members during the entire nineteenth cen-
tury.264 During the Civil War, the chaplain corps thrived in the Union
and Confederacy, even as it became more religiously diverse. Up to
that time, chaplains had always been Protestant Christians; however,
Congress modified the law to allow chaplains who were “regularly or-
dained minister[s] of some religious denomination”—leading to the
first Jewish and Catholic U.S. Army chaplains.265
The spiritual role of the chaplain remained intact during the en-
tirety of the twentieth century. For instance, Army Regulations in
World Wars I and II described the important role of chaplains to pro-
vide soldiers “counsel as to their moral welfare”266 and to “strive to
promote morality, religion, and good order” in their units.267 It was
not until the 1970s and 1980s that concern arose regarding the extent
261. See NORTON, supra note 26, at 1. The chaplain position carried no rank and was
paid six hundred dollars a year—more than a captain’s pay. Id. at 1–2. Moreover, “the
chaplaincy was authorized at a time when religious interest in the United States was at an
unusually low ebb and spiritual deadness characterized the American churches.” Id. at 1.
Nevertheless, Congress still authorized as many Navy chaplains as there were ships in ser-
vice that warranted them (though it appears only two chaplains were retained in the three
years following Congress’s authorization). See DRURY, supra note 223, at 15.
262. See DRURY, supra note 223, at 64–66; NORTON, supra note 26, at 76-78 (describing
various efforts in the 1850s to abolish the military chaplaincy and the defense of the chap-
laincy by laymen).
263. NORTON, supra note 26, at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DRURY,
supra note 223, at 24 (quoting the Secretary of the Navy in 1811 while describing the duties
of chaplains as “to read prayers at stated periods; to perform all funeral ceremonies; to
lecture or preach to the crew on Sundays; to instruct the midshipmen & volunteers in
writing, arithmetic, navigation, & lunar observations, & when required to teach other
youths of the ship”).
264. See NORTON, supra note 26, at 52 (citing GENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE ARMY OF
THE UNITED STATES 34 (1841)). Not only did soldiers need to attend services, officers could
be criminally punished by court-martial under the Second Article of War if they engaged in
“indecent or irreverent behavior at church.” Id.
265. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The first Navy Catholic chaplain arrived in
1888 and the first Jewish chaplain in 1917. DRURY, supra note 223, at 117, 168.
266. REGULATIONS FOR THE ARMY, supra note 224, at para. 461/2(2), at 18. This impor-
tant role for chaplains was reaffirmed in later regulations in 1941. See AR 60-5, supra note
166, at para. 4(a).
267. AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 4(b).
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of religious evangelization by chaplains in the military environment.
Military leadership began to emphasize that “[n]o chaplain is author-
ized to proselytize soldiers or their families.”268 The 1978 constitu-
tional challenge in Katcoff may have sharpened sensitivities in this
area, but the need to support the spiritual needs of servicemembers
was always recognized as critical to national security.269 Since the
1980s, the chaplaincy has continued to adapt to the increasing diver-
sity of religion in the military, including the acceptance of Muslim,
Hindu, and Buddhist chaplains—while always maintaining its faith-
based focus.
In sum, history reflects that the chaplaincy has always been faith-
based. The demand for atheist chaplains challenges the spiritual core
of that organization for the first time in history.
4. A Continuing Free Exercise Need
During the 1980s, the Second Circuit in Katcoff concluded that
members of the military “experience increased needs for religion as
the result of being uprooted from their home environments, trans-
ported often thousands of miles to territories entirely strange to them,
and confronted there with new stresses that would not otherwise have
been encountered if they had remained at home.”270 With the over-
whelming majority of military members still associating with Christian-
ity and other faith-based religions,271 the Free Exercise rationale for
the chaplaincy remains strong today. Indeed, it is perhaps more com-
pelling in today’s highly deployed military environment.
Since the Global War on Terror began, over 2.4 million ser-
vicemembers have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq alone, with
many of these members serving multiple tours of duty.272 In addition,
the United States continues to send its soldiers, sailors, marines, air-
men, and coastguardsmen to the four corners of the globe as part of
268. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985) (summarizing the basic rules
that governed chaplains in the military environment).
269. The Second Circuit in Katcoff explained why military commanders throughout his-
tory have insisted chaplains accompany the men into battle: “In the opinion of top gener-
als of the Army and those presently in the chaplaincy, unless chaplains were made available
in such circumstances the motivation, morale and willingness of soldiers to face combat
would suffer immeasurable harm and our national defense would be weakened accord-
ingly.” Id.
270. Id. at 227.
271. See Dao, supra note 11.
272. See Juliette F. Spelman et al, Post Deployment Care for Returning Combat Veter-
ans, 27 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1200, 1200 (2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3514997/.
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the normal routine of modern military service.273 In many instances,
especially in deployed environments like Afghanistan or Africa, mem-
bers would be entirely deprived of the ability to freely exercise their
beliefs but for the chaplaincy. Even within the continental United
States, good reasons weigh in favor of allowing the presence of mili-
tary chaplains.274 They perform functions that cannot be adequately
served by civilian clergy,275 although on an ad hoc basis civilians can
be contracted to fill crucial needs.276
With religious military members in need both at home and
abroad of access to the spiritual healing mediated by military chap-
lains, the integrity of chaplaincy must be protected now more than
ever. The program should remain intact and vigorously defended
from changes that could negatively impact its crucial religious
services.
273. See DEP’T OF DEF., Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength BY SER-
VICE, REGIONAL AREA, AND COUNTRY (2012), available at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/
dwp/getfile.do?fileNm=SIAD_309_Report_P1212.xlsx&filePathNm=milRegionCountry.
According to year-end DOD statistics for 2012, the U.S. military had approximately 72,000
personnel in Europe; 54,000 in the East Asia/Pacific areas; 4800 in the North Africa/Near
East/South Asia areas; 500 in Sub-Saharan Africa; 2000 in other areas in the Western
Hemisphere; and 200 in the Former Soviet Union. Id.; see also Brief for the Appellees at 4,
In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-5027), 2012 WL 1951338
(“Naval personnel are deployed to nearly 500 geographical duty assignments, over
thousands of miles of open ocean and countries around the globe.”).
274. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[L]ocal civilian clergy in
the rural areas where most military camps are centered are inadequate to satisfy the
soldiers’ religious needs because they are too few in number for the task and are usually of
different religious denominations . . . .”); Rosen, supra note 13, at 1147-48. Rosen explains
that military bases have been less centered in urban areas since the 1980s and that home
base chaplains may still be justified based on activities with local groups that benefit overall
morale of the troops, such as the burial of members at Arlington National Cemetery. Id.
The corps requires chaplains to be part of everyday life for members, who may be re-
turning from deployment in need of a spiritual advisor who understands the rigors of
military life. See discussion supra Part III.D.2. Also, if chaplains were only permitted in re-
mote or deployed locations, it might negatively impact recruitment and retention.
275. DRAZIN & CURREY supra note 23, at 43 (arguing that “civilian clergy could not
function on the battlefield” and that a civilian chaplaincy “would be replete with problems;
a supervisory nightmare”). There is also doubt that civilians would be protected by the
Geneva Convention, whose rules only shelter military chaplains. Id. at 57.
276. See AR 165-1, supra note 13, para. 5-4(a) (“Contracting the Services of civilian
clergy is authorized as an exception to policy when the Army is unable to provide a military
Chaplain to meet the religious worship and sacramental needs of Soldiers and their Family
members.”). This is not a new development. World War II regulations also authorized com-
manding officers—when a chaplain was unavailable—to use money from the chaplain’s
funds “to provide religious guidance and services of worship for their commands through
civilian agencies of the community.” AR 60-5, supra note 166, at para. 9(b).
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B. The Negative Impact of Incorporating Atheists into the
Chaplain Corps
The most compelling argument for atheist chaplains is the one
that appeals to notions of fairness and inclusion.277 Nontheists present
this request as an incremental step, not a radical redefinition. As the
president of one secular group said, the chaplaincy includes monothe-
ists, polytheists, and pantheists, and “once they extend to nontheists
the chaplaincy will have embraced all of the servicemembers and the
breadth of life stances and deeply held personal philosophies.”278 This
suggests that atheists will not fundamentally change the nature of the
chaplaincy. But there is a serious risk that expanding the chaplain
corps in this way will have a significant and lasting impact on how
chaplain services are delivered to believing members who have no-
where else to go in the military for religious services.
1. The Exceptionalism of a Faith-Based Chaplaincy
The previous Part of this Article recounted the millennia-long
history of the military chaplaincy and showed that the spiritual role of
the chaplain has been the essential reason for the position’s existence.
Indeed, the vigor and accessibility of a faith-based chaplain corps is
the cornerstone of the Free Exercise rights of most military members,
who still profess some belief in a higher reality.279 Other individuals
can perform the secular duties sometimes delegated to chaplains, but
no one except a chaplain can—in an official capacity—minister to the
spiritual needs of military members. As Representative John Fleming
argued during the debate over the DOD Appropriations Bill: “The
military is 99.9 percent secular. The only thing that we add to it that is
nonsecular is the chaplaincy.”280
The chaplain corps is peerless in its ability to cater to the relig-
ious needs of the military member. One Air Force chaplain described
it this way: “[C]haplains are uniquely qualified to provide that which
no one else on the battlefield can . . . care for the soldier’s spiritual
277. See House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jared Polis (D., CO))
(“[O]ver 20 percent of the members of our military identify as nonbelievers. While, of
course, their needs should be catered to by members of the chaplaincy from diverse faiths,
it’s only fair to have their humanism, or outlooks, represented.”).
278. Chaplains Wanted for Atheists in Foxholes, supra note 7.
279. See Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228 (“[The military] has proceeded on the premise that
having uprooted the soldiers from their natural habitats it owes them a duty to satisfy their
Free Exercise rights, especially since the failure to do so would diminish morale, thereby
weakening our national defense.”).
280. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943.
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well-being.”281 The example of chaplains throughout history—such as
Father Capodanno and Father Kapaun—exemplifies this exceptional
role. Without such chaplains, the brave men and women of the U.S.
Armed Forces would have little chance to worship God communally in
the religious service of their faith group, and they might have no one
to turn to who can advise them on matters involving such things as the
Holy, the afterlife, and faith-based moral decisions. Only a chaplain
from a faith-based background can cater to these critical needs.
Faith-based chaplains are exceptional because they carry out
functions that other members of the armed forces cannot perform.
Due to the almost entirely secular nature of the military, commanders,
first sergeants, and other military leaders are neither trained nor au-
thorized to use their official positions to advise servicemembers on
religious matters. Similarly, mental health practitioners and doctors
must remain neutral on religious matters, as must military lawyers,
scientists, and other personnel. While some recognition of God and
religion is still authorized in the military,282 day-to-day military life is
largely bereft of the divine. Indeed, secular groups have vigilantly
guarded the neutrality of the official military workplace in recent
years, successfully purging references to God from it.283 This makes
the worth of the faith-based chaplaincy ever more valuable.
In contrast, the rest of the military structure offers a widely availa-
ble, nonreligious perspective on such matters as discipline, ethics,
core values, and every other matter pertaining to military life. If a su-
pervisor is struggling with how to manage a troubled servicemember,
military leaders stand at the ready with practical, experience-based ad-
vice that is necessarily devoid of religious dogma, doctrine, and faith-
based solutions. Similarly, counseling on personal matters involving
family, friends, or emotional concerns can be handled by trained ther-
apists and doctors, who also must necessarily approach such matters
from a nonreligious perspective. Apart from the chaplaincy there is
no official source available to military members where their spiritual
questions and struggles can be addressed in a faith-based context.
Put another way, if every military member were an atheist, the
chaplain corps would be entirely unnecessary because the needs of
281. Beckwith, supra note 168 (ellipses in original).
282. See U.S. AIR FORCE, REVISED INTERIM GUIDELINES CONCERNING FREE EXERCISE IN
THE AIR FORCE (2006) (recognizing Air Force members’ “personal commitment to the
Constitution’s protection for free exercise of religion”).
283. See Achievements, MILITARY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOUND. (last visited May 31, 2014),
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/achievements/ (outlining claimed victories on
behalf of nontheists).
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these secular servicemembers would be filled through the “99.9 per-
cent”284 of the military that is secular. It is precisely the faith-based
requirements of religious military members that justify the existence
of the chaplaincy.
2. Fundamentally Redefining the Chaplain Corps
Contrary to the suggestion of secularists, the acceptance of atheist
chaplains will likely change the chaplain corps’s age-old mission into
something new and different. One expert predicted “‘it would rede-
fine the chaplaincy if a non-faith person becomes a chaplain.’”285 Sim-
ilarly, during the House debate on the DOD Appropriations Act, one
Congressman argued that the admission of atheist chaplains would
“ruin[ ] the integrity of the chaplaincy.” 286 This is not mere political
rhetoric.
To illustrate, consider the viability of the Army chaplaincy’s
motto in a corps that contains members who do not believe in any
higher reality. One Army chaplain doubted how atheists could “sin-
cerely subscribe to the Army chaplain motto, Pro Deo et Patria—for
God and country.”287 That chaplain has it backwards; rather than the
atheist chaplain, it is the Army Chaplain Corps itself that will likely
need to change in order to embrace all segments of a chaplaincy that
encompasses nontheists. As with any military organization, the need
for camaraderie, esprit de corps, and good order and discipline will re-
quire the Army chaplaincy to take a new motto that is inclusive of all
its members, both believers and nonbelievers, since the status quo
would marginalize atheist chaplains.
Similarly, consider how the chaplaincy currently views its essential
mission and core values. In a recent version of the Army Chaplain
Corps’s Strategic Roadmap, the Chief of Chaplains explained the
Army’s vision of the chaplaincy as “a community of many faiths, tradi-
tions and beliefs. . . . Regardless of faith or denomination, we draw
strength from our belief in a higher power, and our determination to
284. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943.
285. Weber, supra note 51 (quoting Paul Vicalvi of the National Association of
Evangelicals Chaplain Commission).
286. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4942 (comments of Rep. Jim Bridenstine (R.,
OK)). Rep. Jim Bridenstine stated: “As a Navy pilot with combat tours in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, I recognize that war affects all servicemembers—believers and atheists. However,
those without faith have plenty of options . . . to seek emotional support.” Id.
287. Carroll, supra note 10 (italics added) (quoting Army Chaplain Lieutenant Colonel
Carlton Birch) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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care for others.”288 Notice how carefully the Army has drafted its cur-
rent vision statement—broad enough to include faiths of all varieties
now represented in its chaplain corps. The document goes on to ex-
plain, “[c]haplains share a common bond—an acknowledgement of
the validity and vitality of religious faith and an abiding commitment
of service to Soldiers, their families, leaders, the Army and the
nation.”289
No longer, once atheist chaplains come on board. A chaplaincy
that embraces both faith and faithlessness within the same ministry
cannot continue to hold such a vision. Inevitably, assimilation of non-
belief will unhinge the common bond and transform the organiza-
tion’s mission into one that does not uniformly recognize the validity
of faith. Indeed, the corps’s vision will need to be re-envisioned in an
even broader sense—perhaps finding that the community “draws its
strength from either a higher power or from within humankind it-
self,” and that the chaplains are joined by a bond that “acknowledges
the validity and vitality of either religious faith or secular self-determi-
nation.” No matter how the words are massaged, they will not be able
to hide the fact that the mission has shifted from its historical roots.
The change of motto and vision will inevitably be followed by
changes in practice. For instance, nonsectarian events sponsored by
the entire chaplain corps—such as luncheons, retreats, and the like—
will need to jettison a purely faith-based approach in exchange for a
more secular model. An event sponsored by an organization that can
no longer prefer belief over unbelief will need to leave out references
to God. In wartime, the effects will be even more pronounced, with a
growing desire to change the practices of past chaplains, such as Fa-
ther Capodanno, who ministered to the troops during battle and en-
couraged them with words about an afterlife. Perhaps even
chaplaincy-sponsored prayer would need to be purged of references
to a Supreme Being or an immortal soul, with those words reserved
for those of the same faith background who attend opt-in services
held in private, designated locations.290
288. U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN CORPS, THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS STRATEGIC ROADMAP: CON-
NECTING FAITH, SERVICE, AND MISSION 16 (2014), available at http://www.chapnet.army.mil/
pdf/strategic_map.pdf.
289. Id.
290. This entire concern about limiting the ability of chaplains to invoke a deity in
prayer raises the possibility that the military’s attempt to force an inclusive political correct-
ness on chaplains will run into constitutional problems under the Religion Clauses. For
instance, the D.C. Circuit was relieved that it could avoid the “rather troubling constitu-
tional question: whether chaplains in the armed services can be required to endorse ‘plu-
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Finally, in a world of limited assets there is also the problem of
diverting scarce chaplain resources away from those in spiritual need.
There are already too few chaplains to meet the growing needs of
servicemembers, even as the military downsizes its chaplain corps.291
As Representative John Fleming argued: “[T]here is a limited number
of chaplains. And if we begin to displace chaplains who are actually
from religious organizations with those who are atheists . . . then that’s
going to limit even the number that’s going to be available to the
others.”292 As one possible parallel, consider the Dutch military chap-
laincy, which employs over thirty humanist counselors and only ninety
Christian chaplains.293 The problem of limited resources can contrib-
ute to the overall decline in chaplain services.
Admitting atheist chaplains will inevitably cause fundamental
change to how the chaplain corps delivers the spiritual services that
have been at its core for the past 235 years. What is unclear, however,
is how severely this redefinition of the chaplaincy will harm the Free
Exercise rights of believing servicemembers.
3. Proposing an Alternative
When determining whether the Free Exercise Clause mandates
atheist chaplains, the impact on the mission of the corps as a whole
should be an important consideration. Indeed, in light of the real pos-
sibility of harm to those religious servicemembers who have always re-
lied on the chaplaincy, military leaders should ask whether redefining
the chaplaincy is truly necessary. One possible alternative would be to
create a specialized secular position to provide humanistic counseling
to nontheist servicemembers in a context entirely outside the histori-
cal, faith-based chaplaincy. This would address the concerns of secular
groups while preserving the integrity of the traditional chaplain corps.
Proponents of nontheist chaplains often point to the Netherlands
as an ally that has incorporated humanist chaplains in its armed forces
ralism’ in their religious practices.” Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(avoiding the issue but noting “Veitch’s argument that a chaplain cannot be obliged to
preach counter to his or her religious beliefs consistent with the First Amendment is hardly
a frivolous claim”). A similar claim could be brought in the future by chaplains forced to
modify their practices to include the pluralism of atheism in the chaplaincy.
291. For instance, in 2011, the Air Force cut its chaplaincy by approximately ten per-
cent. See Scott Fontaine, Air Force Looks to Make Cuts in Chaplain Force, AIR FORCE TIMES
(Nov. 27, 2010), http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20101127/NEWS/11270304/Air-
Force-looks-make-cuts-chaplain-force.
292. House Debate, supra note 5, at H4943 (comments of Rep. John Fleming (R., OK)).
293. Fisher, supra note 185 (interviewing a female humanist chaplain stationed in Af-
ghanistan in 2009).
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since 1964. But even in that country—which is far more secular and
progressive on social issues than the United States—the military has
designated their humanists as something other than chaplains by opt-
ing instead for the term “counselors.”294 More significant, according
to one high-ranking humanist chaplain, the Dutch chaplaincy is quite
different than that found in the United States. For instance, Dutch
“[h]umanist counsellors are appointed as civil servants not commis-
sioned officers . . . and work outside the military hierarchy. . . . Chap-
lains are not formally subject to the orders of the military
commanders.”295 This is a different model than that existing in the
U.S. Armed Forces and cannot practically serve as an example for the
U.S. to emulate.296
The Free Exercise Clause may not require an accommodation for
nontheist military members; however, policymakers may decide other-
wise. If military or civilian leaders decide that principles of fairness
and inclusion justify action, they should look elsewhere than the chap-
lain corps for a solution, in order to preserve the rights of believing
servicemembers.
Conclusion
The motto of the U.S. Army chaplaincy—”For God and Coun-
try”—honors the millennia-old reality of an exclusively faith-based mil-
itary chaplain corps catering to the Free Exercise needs of religious
servicemembers. The recent push for atheist military chaplains chal-
lenges this historic tradition based mostly on fairness arguments seek-
ing inclusion for nontheists. In essence, secularists are seeking a
religious accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause, claiming
that the current services available from theist chaplains and nonreli-
294. Torpy, supra note 183.
295. Id.
296. Unlike the Dutch, religious programs in the U.S. military are supervised by com-
manders who offer “equitable support for religious, spiritual, moral, and ethical activities
of all personnel in their commands”; provide “opportunity, time, and facilities for the free
exercise of religion in accordance with law, regulations, and mission requirements;” and
“[a]ccommodate special religious practices of personnel in their commands.” AR 165-1,
supra note 13, at para. 1-9(a)-(c). For that reason, the U.S. military chaplaincy is a cadre of
commissioned officers who “perform a unique role, serving both as clergy or . . . profes-
sional representative[s] of a particular religious denomination and as . . . commissioned
[military] officer[s].” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal
citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). Therefore, the commissioned of-
ficer status of U.S. military chaplains creates a different dynamic and mission than used in
the Netherlands.
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gious mental health professionals are not adequate to meet the needs
of nontheist servicemembers.
Legal scholars have thoroughly explored the nature of the term
religion under the Free Exercise Clause, and some have proposed ap-
proaches that would broaden the word to embrace even atheism. Yet,
considering the Framers’ original view of religion—combined with in-
consistent treatment of the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court—the bet-
ter definitional approach should stay narrow enough to maintain the
original distinction between religion and nonreligion. As a conse-
quence of this narrower definition, however, nontheists would be una-
ble to invoke the affirmative protections of the Free Exercise Clause.
Even if atheism were treated as a religion, the demand for atheist
chaplains would require further evaluation under the Free Exercise
Clause. Secularist concerns about the confidentiality and adequacy of
mental health counseling miss the mark because these complaints are
not grounded in religious practice and because confidentiality outside
the chaplaincy is sufficient. In addition, worries about theist chaplains
are mostly unfounded because chaplains are trained to minister to
people of all faiths or no faith. Finally, the proposed accommodation
would not solve the stated problem because the admission of a few
atheist chaplains would not change the fact that almost all nontheists
would still need to rely on the services of theist chaplains.
More significant, atheist chaplains could not perform two out of
three required spiritual duty areas within the chaplain corps—at least
not without redefining those essential duties. Secularists could not
hold the faith-based religious observances envisioned by federal law
and military regulation. Nor could they fulfill all the duties of “pas-
toral counseling,” which “is a formal and spiritually integrated pro-
cess” that helps military members “change, cope, and resolve their
presenting issues in a religious framework.”297 In contrast, atheists
would likely be able to satisfy the third duty area as a commander’s
support staff officer, providing advice on various religion-related ar-
eas, since this duty takes place in a more spiritually sterile
environment.
Finally, the admission of atheists could fundamentally redefine
the mission of the chaplain corps and negatively impact the rights of
believing military members who—unlike nontheist servicemembers—
have nowhere else to turn in the military to meet their Free Exercise
needs. The mission of the chaplain corps has been faith-based for
297. AR 165-1, supra note 13, at para. 16-3(a)(3).
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thousands of years and would suffer if it were forced to embrace a
non-faith-based view. It would need to re-form itself from the inside,
which would result in a near complete loss of its historical spiritual
identity. Worse, it would be hampered in delivering the spiritual ser-
vices needed by religious military members both in garrison and on
the battlefield.
If the policymakers or the courts conclude that nontheists should
receive the benefit of atheist counseling, this should occur without
harming the Free Exercise rights of believing servicemembers
through a redefinition of the chaplain corps. Instead, the military ser-
vices should create a specialized secular position to provide humanis-
tic counseling to nontheist servicemembers in a context entirely
outside the historically faith-based chaplaincy.
